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 In this dissertation, I studied the raiding behavior of a slave-making ant, Temnothorax 
americanus, a social parasite whose workforce consists of different ant species. ‘Slave’ 
workers are acquired in coordinated raids during which slave-maker workers attack a host 
colony and steal the immatures (brood). I focused on the mechanisms colonies use to reach 
collective decisions over where raid and on the attack once a raiding site was chosen. In 
Chapter One, I first established which nest characteristics make an optimal raiding choice by 
measuring the benefit of raids (stolen brood), and counterbalancing costs (mortality), at target 
colonies that differed in the number of brood, workers, or their ratios. These experiments 
showed that slave-makers are more successful when attacking colonies where brood 
outnumber workers and where there is an intermediate number of workers. In Chapter Two, I 
tested whether slave-maker colonies demonstrate a preference for such nests and characterize 
their decision-making strategy. Choice trials showed that slave-maker colonies exhibit no 
preference over host colony features. This result led to the question of why not be more 
selective? I then tested for ecological conditions that could favor their low acceptance 
threshold and show that slave-maker colonies encounter host colonies at a very low rate 
 relative to the time when brood is available to raid. Slave-maker colonies therefore ought to 
raid every nest they find rather than pay the opportunity cost of waiting to raid only the best 
host colonies.  In Chapter Three, I investigated the mechanisms of attack and show that 
successful raiding parties effectively evacuate workers while guarding the door to keep the 
brood inside. I also tested how conflict, especially prominent in T. americanus colonies, 
affects this collective behavior. I found that workers from colonies with higher levels of 
worker reproduction initiate attacks alone rather than as a group. In Chapter Four, I explored 
how cooperation and collective behaviors co-evolve by modeling these interactions 
analytically. I adapted mathematical models of cooperative binding from biochemistry to 
characterize collective behaviors that arise in a non-linear fashion.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
A GOLDILOCKS STRATEGY LEADS TO OPTIMAL RAIDING OUTCOMES IN SLAVE-
MAKING ANTS 
 
Introduction 
The study of host-parasite interactions has predominantly focused on the effects of parasites on 
their hosts, however there is relatively less known about how the host environment effects the 
fitness of the parasite (Schmid-Hempel 2011). In order to fully understand the co-evolution of 
hosts and their parasites, it is important to understand the basis of parasite host-choice, i.e. which 
features of a host are optimal from the perspective of the parasite.   
 When host density is sufficient for host-choice, some researchers have hypothesized that 
parasites ought to prefer hosts in the best condition, from which a maximum quantity or value of 
resources can be exploited (Valera et al. 2004). Alternatively, others have hypothesized that 
parasites ought to prefer hosts that can least effectively resist attack, such as hosts that are 
immuno-compromised (e.g. the tasty chick hypothesis; Christie et al. 1998).  There is mixed 
support for either of these hypotheses, and it is more likely that parasites optimize host-selection 
though a compromise between the above two factors to optimize the net profitability of a host 
(Théron et al. 1998; Cervo & Turillazi), as is predicted by optimal foraging theory (Stephens & 
Krebs 1986). 
 These hypotheses have been investigated almost exclusively in ectoparasites that infect as 
a single autonomous organism, like flies (Valera et al. 2004), fleas (Krasnov et al 2005; 
Tschirren et al. 2007) or trematodes (Théron et al. 1998).  However, parasites sometimes consist 
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of multiple individuals, who attack as a collective, as is the case with social parasites, like slave-
making ants (Buschinger 2009), or pathogens, like protozoa or bacteria (Schmid-Hempel 2011). 
When a parasite attacks as a group, the dynamics of attack or infection are likely to differ from 
those between a lone parasite and its host. For instance, groups may be more robust to host 
defenses than lone individuals, since injury of one individual may not be fatal to the success of 
the attack. If this were the case, groups may be less sensitive to host defenses than parasites 
consisting of a single individual and predicts that parasite groups ought to weigh the value of 
host resources more heavily than its defensibility. On the other hand, evidence from 
epidemiology, in which parasites or pathogens attack as a group, suggests that group size is of 
utmost importance. Pathogens that adopt a “frontal attack” strategy (Merrell & Falkow 2004) on 
their hosts typically withhold attack until their numbers reach a threshold, termed an “infectious 
dose” (Schmid-Hempel & Frank 2007). Quorum sensing bacteria are one example of this 
strategy, only inducing attack once they have reached a critical mass (Gama et al 2012; Miller & 
Bassler 2001). Similarly, attack is group-size dependent in the facultative slave-making ant 
Myrmecocytus mimicus (Hölldobler 1976). Colonies perform ritualized displays to advertise 
fighting power, and will only raid after determining that the size of its rival is less numerous. 
These attack strategies suggest that host defensibility, or more specifically, relative fighting 
power, should be weighed more heavily in decisions over host choice. By this logic, there is no 
single best host choice for the parasite, but rather the optimal choice depends more strongly on 
the parasite’s condition or group size. 
 Here, I investigate host-choice in a parasite that attacks collectively by measuring the 
relative importance of several key host traits on parasite success. I use the obligate slave-making 
ant, Temnothorax (=Protomagnathus) americanus, which collectively attacks other ant colonies 
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in coordinated raids (Wesson 1939). I measure both the benefits and costs to slave-maker 
colonies as a function of each of the following host features:  the host’s (1) resource value, (2) 
defensibility, (3) the ratio between the latter two, and (4) the host’s group size relative to the 
parasite’s. While slave-makers depend on chemical manipulation of their hosts in order to 
increase their chances of success (Regnier & Wilson 1971; Brandt et al 2006), it is especially 
unclear how relative fighting power influences raiding success in slave-making ants, and thus 
what constitutes an optimal host choice.  
 As obligate social parasites, T. americanus depends on host workers for all necessary 
colony tasks, including foraging, brood care, and other nest maintenance (Alloway 1983). The 
more host-workers a colony has, the more individuals available to perform these necessary tasks, 
and as expected. Thus, the best measure of a colony’s payoff in a raiding bout is the total amount 
of worker brood the slave-maker colony acquires, but I confirm this here. If resource value is the 
most important factor in host-choice, then slave-makers will always do best to target nests 
containing the largest quantities of brood. This hypothesis is supported by a prior study on T. 
americanus, which finds that slave-makers prefer the largest hosts, as determined through 
behavioral choice-tests (Pohl & Foitzik 2011). These findings are inconclusive, since their results 
could be explained by a biased discovery rate at larger nests rather than an innate preference.  
 Pohl & Foitzik’s (2011) study are surprising because slave-makers are also predicted to 
consider the defensiblity of a host nest, or the number of workers defending the nest under 
attack. During raids, slave-makers release a chemical called a propaganda substance to interrupt 
host defenses (Regnier & Wilson 1971; Brandt et al 2006), but host workers still fight back by 
immobilizing, biting and stinging individual slave-maker workers (personal observation), 
sometimes leading to death. Slave-maker mortality has costs for future raiding opportunities, as 
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T. americanus conducts multiple raids per season (6 on average, Foitzik & Herbers 2001). In 
addition to posing a mortality risk, host workers act to protect their brood by carrying it away 
from the nest to hide in the leaf-litter, effectively reducing the quantity of brood available to the 
slave-makers (Kleeburg et al. 2014). If host defensiblity is the most important factor in host-
choice, then slave-makers will acquire the most brood and suffer the fewest mortalities at target 
nests with the fewest workers.  
 The optimal host choice will therefore be one that maximizes brood acquisition while 
minimizing slave-maker mortality, or more specifically, which minimizes the worker-to-brood 
ratio. However, the range of possible ratios may be constrained by the biology of the host. In 
most host organisms, resource value and defensibility are inextricably linked, such that hosts in 
good condition tend to mount strong immune defenses (Sheldon & Verhulst 1996). Likewise, 
host nests containing high numbers of brood are also likely to contain a high number of workers, 
and vice versa (Hölldobler & Wilson 1990). To test the assumption that there are natural 
constraints on worker-to-brood ratios, I censused naturally occurring host nests and determined 
the degree of correlation between the two. I then investigated the optimal compromise between 
brood number and defensibility by examining the effects of worker-to-brood ratios and absolute 
colony size on raiding success.  
 The optimal host size (i.e. worker number) may be affected by a more complex set of 
factors, especially with constraints on the worker-to-brood ratio. Preferring hosts with few 
workers may make it easier to steal the brood, but such colonies are likely to have few brood in 
the first place. Conversely, hosts with large quantities of brood may also be guarded by more 
workers. It is not straightforward what balance of workers and brood will lead to the best 
outcomes for slave-makers.  
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 Furthermore, optimal host size may also depend on the size of the slave-maker colony 
itself. T. americanus colonies are always smaller than the hosts they raid, so there will always be 
a colony size asymmetry, but the extent of this asymmetry can vary substantially. Even though 
they are outnumbered, the numerical advantage given to slave-makers for deploying propaganda 
substances or having larger bodies is unquantified in any slave-making species. To investigate 
the consequences of such battles on optimal host size, I analyzed the effect of relative fighting 
power (i.e number of workers between parasite and host) on raiding outcomes. If group attack 
strategies are more resilient to host defenses than solo strategies, then slave-maker colonies may 
be less vulnerable to larger host colonies (Oster & Wilson 1978). This hypothesis predicts a one-
size fits all strategy of optimal host choice. Depending on the potency of the parasite’s 
manipulative strategies or combat techniques, group attacks may alternatively be sensitive to 
group size asymmetries, affecting brood stolen and/or mortality. Such size-dependent dynamics 
have precedent in other social insects in which there is combat over territory or resources 
(Plowes & Adams 2005; McGlynn 2000). If relative colony size does have consequences for 
raiding success, then optimal host size would scale with slave-maker size. This latter hypothesis 
predicts that the greater the colony size asymmetry, the lower the raiding success and the higher 
the mortality.  
 I test the above hypotheses for which colony attributes make an optimal raiding site for 
the slave-maker T. americanus using experimental raids in the lab. I offer slave-maker colonies 
target nests that varied in their number of workers, brood and the ratio between the two, and 
measured the raiding outcomes of those trials in terms of their benefits (number of brood stolen) 
and their costs (mortality). 
Methods 
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Colony Collection & Census 
 Temnothorax americanus uses three host species: T. longispinosus, T. ambiguus, and T. 
curvispinosus. The populations measured in this study consisted almost exclusively of T. 
longispinosus hosts, and all experimental host colonies were T. longispinosus. T. americanus and 
T. longispinosus colonies were collected at the Huyck Preserve (42° 30' 53.7876", -74° 8' 
27.7836"), Cornell Plantations Land (42° 27' 55.2738", -76° 26' 34.299") and at Bear Mountain 
State Park (41° 18' 33.9768", -74° 0' 14.6808") between May and July, 2013 – 2016. Colonies 
were transported back to Liddell Labs in Ithaca, NY in Ziploc bags and stored in a refrigerator 
(4C) for up to three weeks before being censused for counts of the following: queens, workers, 
mature sexuals, larvae, and pupae (worker and sexual). In the trials below, mean slave-maker (T. 
americanus) colony size was 6.31±0.39 slave-maker workers (min: 2, max: 17), not including 
the queen. 
Colony Maintenance & Preparation 
 Immediately following counts, a colony was placed inside a nest box containing an 
artificial nest, into which it moved. Artificial nests consisted of a balsa wood or plexiglass U-
shape structure placed in between 2 microscope slides. Nest were then wrapped in foil to exclude 
light and housed in a plastic Ziploc box with a plaster floor, which was moistened twice per 
week to maintain humidity levels. Colonies were fed a teaspoon of Bhatkar diet twice per week 
and housed in a room at 26 C, with a 14L:10D daylight cycle. 
 Prior to raids, all slave-maker colonies experienced the same conditions to standardize 
any possible sense of urgency that might influence raiding behaviors. Two days prior to raiding, 
I removed all brood and some adult slaves from the colony so that there was a 1:1 ratio of slave-
makers (including the queen) to slave ants. Slave-ants were relocated to a temporary nest without 
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any slave-makers until after the raiding trial was complete. During the removals, each slave-
maker worker was individually marked with RC Car Pactra Paint, with a dot on the abdomen, 
thorax and head. Ants were isolated in vials for at least four hours while paint dried before being 
reintroduced to the rest of the colony. Two days later, slave-maker colonies were used in raiding 
trials. 
 One to five days before a raid, T. longispinosus nests were prepared by randomly 
selecting a set number of workers and brood items from an existing lab colony. A mixture of 
larvae and pupae were selected for each trial, but the relative number of larvae and pupae were 
held constant between nests containing the same brood counts. When nests contained insufficient 
brood for the treatment, I added brood from other lab colonies, but always from colonies 
collected from the same population. These size-engineered colonies were then given a naturally 
emptied acorn or hickory nut to move in to, with a single entry hole that never exceeded 2 mm.  
Raid Set-up 
 Raiding trials took place in glass arenas. On the morning of a raiding trial, a prepared 
slave-maker nest was positioned at one end of the arena and a target nest on the opposite end. 
Target nests were placed close to arena wall, but were not touching the wall to avoid unnatural 
bias in nest discovery from wall-following behavior. In all trials, the temperature was elevated to 
30C the morning of the raid, and a plastic dish of food and a dish of wet cotton were placed in 
the center of the arena to prevent dehydration or starvation during the trials. The upper rims of 
the 13 cm high walls were painted with Vaseline to prevent ants from escaping. 
 The entrances of the target and the slave-maker nests were filmed using a webcam 
(Logitech C920 HD Pro), pointed through the transparent arena wall or positioned above the 
nest. If by 4pm, there were no slave-makers recruiting to or attacking the target nest, both 
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colonies were removed from the glass arena and returned to their boxes until the next day. The 
colonies were given a maximum of five days to initiate a raid before the trial was aborted. If 
there was evidence of recruitment or a raid (i.e. the target nest had vacated, there was a raiding 
party in the arena, or slave-makers were entering or exiting the target nest), I left both colonies in 
the arena overnight and collected both colonies the next morning, so that colonies stayed in the 
arena for 24 (±4) hours. The raiding room was set to the same lighting regime as the room 
housing colonies, and I lowered the temperature back to 26C to coincide with darkness. After 
completion of a trial, I confirmed that a raid had been attempted or initiated by watching 
recordings of the two nests. 
Experimental Raiding Trials 
 To test which aspects of target nests influence the number of brood stolen and slave-
maker mortality rates, I conducted single-choice raiding trials using target nests that differed in 
their worker and brood combinations. Despite some variation in the size of the raiding arenas 
between trials, arena size did not have a significant effect on raiding success (45 cm versus 100 
cm arenas for nests containing 25:25 workers : brood (t = -0.3257, df = 16.032, p = 0.749).  
 The morning after each raid, I retrieved both nests and collected any remaining ants from 
within the arena, i.e. outside of either nest, and counted the contents of both nests on that day. To 
determine the number of brood stolen by slave-makers, I counted the total number of brood in 
possession by slave-makers after the raid, as all slave-makers started each raid with zero brood. 
Occasionally, slave-maker colonies moved in to the host colony’s nest, taking control of the 
brood within, and I included these instances into counts of brood acquired from raids.  
Benefits 
(a) Worker-to-Brood Ratios 
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 To test the effect of worker-to-brood ratios on brood stolen, I conducted two sets of trials 
with nests of variable ratios. I fist compared trials with targets containing 25:25 or 50:25 workers 
: brood, which kept brood number constant while varying the ratios (1:1 vs 2:1). Twelve T. 
americanus colonies were used in 19 trials, and colonies were never used more than once for the 
same treatment. I also compared trials with 20:20 or 20:60 workers : brood, which kept worker 
number constant while comparing a different set of ratios (1:1 vs 1:3). Thirteen T. americanus 
colonies were used in 19 trials. The above trials were conducted in rectangular glass arenas 
measuring 45cm x 25cm.  For the latter trials, host colonies were housed in the plexiglass nests 
described above. 
(b) Worker Number 
 To test the effect of absolute worker number on the proportion of brood stolen, I 
conducted three sets of trials with targets that differed in their number of workers (25, 50 & 100 
workers), but which held the worker-to-brood ratio constant at 1:1 workers : brood. Fourteen T. 
americanus were used in 15 raiding trials. In these trials, the slave-maker and its target were 
placed 100 cm apart by connecting two glass arenas, described above, with a paper bridge 10 cm 
in length, and colonies were housed in balsa wood nests described above.  
(c) Brood Number 
 To test the effect of absolute brood number on the total number of brood stolen, I used 
the same trials as above (B), but analyzed the total number of brood rather than the proportion.  
(d) Relative Colony Size 
To investigate the effect of the relative size of slave-maker and target colonies on the proportion 
of brood stolen, I pooled all raiding trials from above and included additional trials with target 
nests containing 50:30 and 30:10 workers : brood, totaling 57 raiding trials with 38 different T. 
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americanus colonies. The latter set of trials took place in square glass arenas measuring 75 cm x 
75 cm. 
Costs 
 Mortality was determined by taking the difference between a colony’s living slave-maker 
workers on the day of the raid and the day after the raid. To determine which of the above factors 
influence slave-maker mortality, I pooled mortality data from all raiding trials described above, 
totaling 67 trials using 44 T. americanus colonies. More raids are included in this analysis than 
above due to missing data on brood stolen. 
Analyses 
 All analyses were performed in R version 3.1.2.  To determine the naturally occurring 
worker-to-brood ratios and absolute colony sizes if the target species, I measured the mean and 
standard error number of workers and brood from all T. longispinosus nests collected between 
2014 and 2016. I compared the number of adult workers to the number of worker brood (larvae 
and pupae) with a linear regression, using the “lm” function in the “stats” R package. To confirm 
that colonies with more host-workers tend to produce a higher number of sexual offspring, I fit 
the number of reproductives per slave-maker colony (male and female alates) to the number of 
host workers using a linear regression. 
 I compared the number of brood stolen from nests containing a 25:25 worker-to-brood 
ratio with nests containing a 50:25 worker-to-brood ratio using a one-sided Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. I corrected for 3 ties in the data using the “wilcox.exact” function in the 
“exactRankTests” R package. I also compared the proportion of brood stolen from nets 
containing 20:20 and 20:60 worker-to-brood ratios using a one-sided Wilcox test. 
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 For the following analyses, I used Generalized Linear Models (GLM) using the “glm” 
function in the “lme4” package version 1.1-12 (Bates et al. 2016). I performed multi-model 
averaging using the “dredge” and “model.avg” functions from the “MuMIn” package version 
1.15.6 (Bartoń 2016) using model selection criteria of AICc <4 (Bolker et al. 2009; Burnham et 
al. 2011). I report the results of the conditional models. Additionally, I report standardized model 
estimates (β), derived by multiplying each coefficient by the ratio of the standard deviations of 
the predictor variable and response variable (beta = TRUE in the “model.avg” function). The 
specific global models and model distributions are described for each case below.  
 Using trials with target nests containing a 1:1 ratio of workers-to-brood (25:25, 50:50, 
and 100:100 workers:brood), I tested for the effect of absolute colony size on raiding success by 
running a Generalized Linear Model (GLM). To account for the different number of brood 
available in each nest, the response variable was modeled as a proportion, consisting of two 
vectors: number of brood successfully stolen and number of brood remaining. Due to the binary 
structure of the response variable, the GLM used a binominal distribution and logit link function 
(Zuur et al. 2009). The global model contained the following predictor variables: the number of 
host workers in the target nest, the number slave-maker workers and their interaction term (Table 
1.1(A)). The data were overdispersed, so models were ranked using QAICc (Burnham & 
Anderson 2002).   
 To test the hypothesis that more brood will be stolen from nests containing an absolute 
greater number of brood, I ran a GLM and multi-model averaging using the same 1:1 worker-to-
brood ratio trials as above, but with the absolute number of brood stolen as the response variable 
and with a Negative Binomial distribution. The global model included: the number of available 
brood in the target nest, the number slave-maker workers, and their interaction term (Table 
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1.1(B)). I did not include the number of workers in the target nest because it is perfectly collinear 
with brood number (1:1 worker-to-brood ratio).  
 To test the hypothesis that relative size of slave-maker and target colonies will affect 
raiding success (i.e. proportion of brood stolen), I ran a GLM that included data from all raiding 
trials. The global model included the following predictor variables: number of workers in the 
target nest, number of slave-maker workers, their interaction term, number of brood, and the 
interaction between number of brood and workers in the host nest (Table 1.2). I partitioned the 
analysis with a hurdle model because the data were overdispersed and zero inflated (20.7% of 
trials had zero success). First, I ran a binomial model of whether brood were captured using the 
entire data-set. Then, using only non-zero data, I ran a model of the proportion of brood stolen 
using the two-vector response variable (brood stolen, brood remaining) with a binomial 
distribution and logit link function. The non-zero model of proportions was still overdispersed 
(448 residual deviance on 56 residual df) after removing zeros, so I performed model averaging 
using QAICc.  
 To test for the effects of target nest characteristics on slave-maker mortality, I modeled 
mortality rates both as a proportion and as count data using a GLM. The global model included 
the following as predictors: number of slave-maker workers, number of host colony workers, 
their interaction term, the number of brood in the host nest and the interaction between number 
of host workers and their brood. Mortality data were overdispersed and zero-inflated (50.7% of 
trails contained zero deaths), so I modeled mortality using a hurdle mode. First, I ran a binomial 
model of whether mortality occurred. Then, I modeled mortality rates for non-zero data in two 
ways, first as a proportion and second as count data of absolute number of deaths. For the 
proportion model, the response variable consisted of two vectors, the number of deaths and the 
13 
 
number of survivors, following a binomial distribution and logit link function. For the count 
model, I used a Poisson distribution.  
 
Results 
Natural Colonies 
 For the 244 T. longispinosus nests censused, the mean worker-to-brood ratio was 
1.34±0.19 (SE). The mean nest contained 36.1±2.2 workers and the mean number of worker 
brood was 50.8±2.7 (larvae + worker pupae). Brood number was significantly positively related 
to worker number (p<0.0001, R2 =0.15, F(1,242) = 44.09; Fig. 1.1).  Slave-maker reproductive 
success was positively related to the number of host workers in that colony (p<0.0001, R2 =0.18, 
F(1,233) = 51.98; Fig. 1.2). 
Benefits 
(a) Worker-to-Brood Ratios 
 As predicted, more brood is stolen from nests with proportionally fewer workers than 
brood, i.e. with a smaller worker-to-brood ratio. When target nests were matched for number of 
brood, marginally more brood was stolen from nests containing 25 workers than nests containing 
50 (p = 0.0468, W = 23.5, n=19 raids; Fig. 1.3A). As expected, proportionally more brood was 
stolen from nests containing 60 brood than 20 brood, even though they were matched for worker 
number (p = 0.0014, W=8, n=19 raids; Fig 1.3B).  
(b) Worker Number 
 The absolute number of workers in the target nest had a negative effect on the outcome of 
raids. This result arises from raids on nests where the worker-to-brood ratio was kept constant at 
1:1 (Fig 1.4) and when the data from all raids were pooled (see Relative Colony Size; Table 1.2). 
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The proportion of brood stolen at nests with a 1:1 ratio, but that varied in their absolute numbers, 
was significantly negatively related to the number of workers guarding the nest (p <0.0001, 
standardized estimate = -0.044, n= 15 raids; Table 1.1A), and had a stronger influence than the 
size of the slave-maker colony (Worker importance = 1, Slave-maker worker importance = 0.32). 
The size of the attacking slave-maker colony had a small, but positive effect on the proportion of 
stolen brood (p < 0.001, estimate = 0.021).  QAICs were calculated using the overdispersion 
parameter c-hat =13.89. Relative colony size did not explain the variation in the data and was not 
included in final models. In summary, increasing the absolute number of defending workers at 
the target nest resulted in proportionally fewer stolen brood for a slave-maker colony.  
(c) Brood Number 
 Despite the negative effect of worker number on the proportion of brood stolen, I 
predicted that the absolute number of brood stolen in these same trials (with 1:1 worker-to-brood 
ratios) would be greater in nests containing more brood; however, this prediction was not 
satisfied. None of the factors were strong predictors of the number of brood stolen in these trials. 
The null model had the lowest AIC score, which did not include any of the predictors. In 
addition, the results of model-averaging showed that the number of brood in the target nest did 
not have a significant effect on the absolute brood stolen (p = 0.127; Table 1.1B), and its effect 
was in the opposite direction than predicted (standardized estimate = -0.07). The effect of the 
slave-maker colony size was marginally significant (p = 0.045) and had a weak positive effect on 
the number of brood stolen (Table 1.1B).  Model selection eliminated any models containing the 
interaction term. 
(d) Relative Colony size 
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 When all raiding trials are pooled, the relative colony size (Table 1.2), between a slave-
maker colony and a target colony, is not an important determinant of raiding success. For the 
first part of the hurdle model, i.e. the binary response, model-averaging resulted in a model that 
included all factors, with slave-maker colony size as the most important factor (relative 
importance = 0.95). For comparison, the relative importance of relative colony size (i.e. the 
interaction between slave-maker and target colony sizes) was 0.18 (Table 1.2A). However, none 
of the factors had significant p-values (Table 1.2A).  
 The results of the second part of the hurdle model, i.e. non-zero data, also fail to support 
the importance of relative colony size in raiding success (Table 1.2B). Relative colony size (i.e. 
the interaction between slave-maker and target colony sizes) was eliminated in model selection. 
The final model-averaged results indicate that number of workers in the host nest was the most 
important factor, with a small negative effect (p < 0.001, estimate = -0.030, relative importance = 
1.00; Table 1.2B). QAICc values used in model selection were calculated with the 
overdispersion parameter c-hat = 6.757.  
Costs 
 None of the host nest characteristics were strong predictors of slave-maker mortality, 
however slave-maker colony size had a weak effect (Table 1.3). In all models of mortality, high 
AIC values eliminated the interaction term between target and slave-maker colony sizes before 
model-averaging due to AICc criteria.  In the binary part of the hurdle model, none of the factors 
were significant predictors of mortality, but of those in the final model, slave-maker worker 
number had the highest relative importance (0.84) and a positive effect (β = 1.161; Table 1.3A). 
A similar pattern results from the proportion mortality model, in which slave-maker worker 
number also has the highest relative importance (1.00), but a weak negative effect (β = -0.161; 
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Table 1.3B).  The count model poorly explained the variation in mortality, as the best model (i.e. 
the model with the lowest AICc score) was the null model, containing none of the predictor 
variables.  
 
Discussion 
 T. americanus colonies experience differential benefits based on the characteristics of the 
colony they raid. The most influential factor in the success of raids was the absolute number of 
host workers defending the target nest (Tables 1.1 & 1.2). The more host workers defending a 
nest, the fewer brood a slave-maker colony was able to steal (Fig 1.3A & 1.4). This is consistent 
with the prediction that better defended hosts will lead to lower pay-offs for the parasite.  
 One the other hand, the number of brood in the nest was not universally a strong 
predictor of brood stolen. The number of brood in the nest was a strong positive predictor of 
stolen brood at nests with small to moderate numbers of workers (20 workers; Fig 1.3B). 
However, when brood varied along with worker number (in 1:1 worker-to-brood nest trials), the 
effect of worker number at high levels (i.e. 100 workers) made any benefit of high brood 
numbers obsolete because those brood were inaccessible (Fig 1.4).  
 As expected, minimizing worker-to-brood ratios had a positive effect on the number and 
proportion of brood stolen (Fig 1.3). The natural variation in these ratios from census data reveal 
that slave-makers could benefit by discriminating hosts based on worker-to-brood ratios, 
however the margin of benefit may be quite small. There is a strong correlation between the 
number of workers and brood in natural host nests (mean ratio = 1.34±0.19; Fig 1.1), confirming 
that there is a biological constraint on the range of possible worker-to-brood ratios. Hence, nests 
with extreme ratio values are unlikely to be found (i.e. few workers with many brood and vice 
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versa).  The importance of this constraint is that it places upper bounds on what the optimal host 
size can be. Because brood number will likely track worker number, maximizing brood is limited 
by a slave-maker colony’s capacity control the host workers in that same nest. Given these 
results, slave-maker colonies will do best to avoid the best defended nests, even though they are 
likely to contain more brood. This constraint also suggests that slave-makers ought to avoid very 
small targets because those nests are likely to contain very few brood. Thus, moderately sized 
hosts appear to maximize profitability. 
 Being a larger slave-maker colony does not grant easy access to the largest host nests, 
although it does ease the challenge slightly (Tables 1.1 & 1.2). However relative colony sizes 
between the host and parasite never played a significant role in raiding success in my trails. 
Differential success based on slave-maker colony size alone indicates that colonies could scale 
their preferences based on their own size, although the failure of relative colony size to influence 
success suggests that any preference adjustments would have minimal effects. Instead, the strong 
negative effect of host nest defensibility suggests that slave-makers ought to universally reject 
very large colonies, but does not conclusively suggest that all slave-maker colonies, regardless of 
size, should have the same host preferences. 
 It is unclear from this study whether the slight advantage given to larger slave-maker 
colonies is due to their enhanced success in combat and/or due to their advantage in retrieving 
brood. More detailed analysis of the behavioral interactions between slave-makers and their 
target colony could reveal how colony size confers this advantage. Depending on the details of 
combat, further investigation could reveal at which host colony sizes there are diminishing 
returns for invasion, and refine predictions about the optimal host size. Given that several slave-
maker species have adapted chemical strategies to deal with more numerous workers at the site 
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of attack (Lenoir et al. 2001), it is possible these chemical strategies dilute the added benefit of 
increased fighting power. Knowledge of the specific effects of propaganda pheromone on the 
dynamics of combat between differently sized colonies, as suggested by Franks & Partridge 
(1986), would clarify the effect of relative colony size on raiding success.  
 Contrary to expectations, host nests characteristics (i.e. worker number, brood number, 
etc.) did not predict rates of slave-maker mortality during raids. Patterns of mortality were 
instead weakly, but positively, associated with the size of the slave-maker colony itself. These 
results indicate that mortality rates have less to do with the features of the raided nest, and more 
to do with features intrinsic to the slave-maker colony. The prediction that large slave-maker 
colonies would experience lower mortality rates than smaller colonies was not satisfied, 
suggesting that larger colonies are not necessarily any better at protecting themselves from nest 
defenders than smaller ones. Because slave-maker colonies do not appear to pay a mortality 
penalty for raiding larger nests, colonies should be indifferent to host size as it pertains to risk. 
 These mortality findings also suggest that workers in larger colonies take more risks. 
Other studies on social insects show that older, and therefore larger, colonies expose themselves 
to greater risk. For example, younger harvester ant colonies will more readily cease foraging 
when patrol workers fail to return, whereas mature colonies are less likely to stop or reduce 
foraging rates under the same conditions (Gordon 1987). On the other hand, larger colonies may 
simply experience greater risk because more total slave-maker workers participate in raids than 
in small colonies.   
  These findings here are inconsistent with the conclusions reached by Pohl & Foitzik 
(2011), which found that T. americanus colonies prefer nests containing high worker numbers. 
As with other behavioral tests of host preference, Pohl & Foitzik (2011) could not robustly 
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distinguish preference from discovery bias since slave-makers rarely sampled both options 
before making their choice. The next obvious step is to investigate whether slave-maker colonies 
behaviorally demonstrate a preference for the predicted nest characteristics. 
 Other studies investigating the optimal host choice for social parasites have only 
examined species which attack as a lone individual. A study of a social parasite on Allodapine 
bee colonies showed that the parasite always preferred the largest colonies (Smith & Schwarz 
2008). This contrast may be due to the fact that the parasite peacefully co-exists with host and 
never initiates attack, suggesting defensibility is unimportant to the parasite; however, the 
findings of this study also could not distinguish detectability from preference. The only other 
study of social parasite host preference, on Polistes sulcifer, had results more consistent with the 
findings here (Cervo & Turillazzi 1996). The parasite preferred larger colonies, but had a 
stronger preference for nests with the highest density of pupae, regardless of nest size. Like T. 
americanus, the parasite attacks the host colony, but will usurp the nest for herself, suggesting 
that host defensibility is relevant in optimal host choice for this species, as well.   
 Although not considered in this study explicitly, distance is likely to weigh into the 
balance of costs and benefits of what constitutes an optimal raiding target. Although I found no 
effect of distance in this study, measures of costs and benefits of distance in the lab are unlikely 
to capture the true threats that more distant nests pose, other than energy expenditure. 
Experiments in rock ants demonstrate that distance is an important factor for colonies in 
selecting a new nest site, but that they weigh nest volume and integrity higher than distance 
(Franks et al. 2008). This may not be the case with slave-makers, since the colony must also 
transport brood between the site of attack and home in multiple trips, which is potentially more 
risky and energetically expensive than a single relocation event.  
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 Another potential consideration for slave-makers is the aggression of the host colony, 
which has been shown to vary considerably both between and within populations (Jongpier et al. 
2014; Kleeburg 2015; Pamminger et al. 2011). More aggressive colonies defend their nests more 
effectively and cause more harm to slave-maker workers. It is unclear at this point how a scout 
might evaluate the aggression level of a colony without being attacked herself, thereby 
preventing recruitment entirely. Nonetheless, it has the potential to be an important consideration 
for a slave-maker colony should they be capable of this assessment.  
 Even though aggression may be difficult to measure for a slave-maker worker, gathering 
information about worker number and brood number are also likely to be challenging. But given 
there are benefits to this knowledge prior to initiating an attack, it is plausible that slave-maker 
nervous systems have evolved sensitivity to various odors associated with workers and their 
brood. Work is currently underway to investigate the mechanisms by which slave-maker workers 
can detect these relevant nest features and whether they behaviorally respond to stimuli of 
different worker or brood numbers.   
  The determinants of optimal host choice in the slave-making ant are similar to those 
involved in other parasites. Attacking as a group had little to no effect on the outcomes of host 
selection, and are inconsistent with the patterns of infection shared by other parasites that attack 
as a group (i.e. pathogens, Myrmecocystus ants). Further knowledge of the specific attack 
strategies of T. americanus will help explain why parasite size has little influence over host 
choice. Finally, by establishing the features of an optimal raiding choice, future research on slave 
raiding behavior can look deeper into the mechanisms for how colonies reach decisions over 
where to raid, and whether the features of host value or defensibility are communicated or 
deliberated over as a colony.  
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Figure 1.1: The contents of natural T. longispinosus nests are plotted, with worker number on 
the x-axis and brood number on the y-axis. Brood counts consist of larvae and worker pupae, 
excluding reproductive pupae. Brood number is positively correlated with worker number, 
however most points fall above or below the line of regression (R2 =0.15). The majority of nests 
contain fewer than 75 workers but can contain as many as 300. 
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Figure 1.2: Slave-maker reproductive success in terms of male and female sexuals (alates) 
plotted is positively correlated with the number of host workers in the colony (p<0.0001, n=264 
colonies).  
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Figure 1.3: Slave-maker colonies obtain more brood when raiding nests with lower worker-to-
brood ratios. Worker-to-brood ratios are indicated on the x-axis and underneath are the actual 
number of workers and brood used to create the corresponding ratios. Box-plots refer to the 
median and 25% and 75% quantiles. (A) Nests contained 25 workers, but differed in the number 
of defending workers, with either 25 or 50 workers per nest (25 workers, 1:1 ratio; p = 0.0468, 
n=19).  (B) Nests contained 20 workers, but differed in the number of brood items, with either 20 
or 60 brood per nest. A greater total number of brood is stolen from nests that contained more 
brood (60 brood, 1:3 ratio), even though they were matched for number of workers defending the 
nest (p = 0.0014, n=19 raids). 
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Figure 1.4: Absolute number of stolen brood is plotted for trials at nests containing 1-to-1 
worker-to-brood ratios, but which differ in their size. Target nests contained either 25, 50 or 100 
workers and brood items. Box-plots refer to the median and 25% and 75% quantiles. Although 
nests of 100 or 50 contained more total brood, raids at nests containing 25 workers and brood 
resulted in higher numbers of brood stolen (p <0.0001, n= 14 raids). 
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Table 1.1: Factors affecting brood stolen as (A) a proportion and (B) as an absolute number, 
from nests of varying sizes with 1:1 worker-to-brood ratios. Summary of results from model 
averaging of each global model. N = 14 trials 
 
Parameters 
 
Standardize
d Estimates 
(±SE) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval  
(2.5,97.5) 
Z P-value Relative 
Importance 
 
Importance of Worker Number? 
A) Proportion of Brood Stolen  
GLOBAL MODEL: Proportion Brood Stolen ~ Host Workers + Slave-Maker Workers + 
Host Workers x Slave-Maker Workers 
 
Intercept 
 
0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Host Workers 
 
-0.044 
(±0.005) 
-0.055, -
0.034 
8.287 < 0.001 1.00 
Slave-Maker 
Workers 
 
0.021 
(±0.004) 
0.012, 0.029 4.801 < 0.001 0.32 
 
   
Importance of Brood Number? 
B) Absolute Number of Brood Stolen  
GLOBAL MODEL: Number Brood Stolen ~ Host Brood + Slave-Maker Workers + Host 
Brood x Slave-Maker Workers        
Intercept 
 
0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Slave-Maker 
Workers 
 
0.084 
(±0.038) 
0.002, 0.167 2.006 0.045 0.47 
Host Brood 
 
- 0.070 
(±0.042) 
- 0.161, 
0.020 
1.527 0.127 0.41 
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Table 1.2: Factors influencing brood stolen for all trials. Due to zero-inflation, data were 
analyzed in a hurdle Model: (A) First, with brood capture as a binary response variable 
(Yes/No), and (B) then, as a continuous variable, using only non-zero data.  N = 57 trials.       
Parameters 
 
Standardized 
Estimates (±SE) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval  
(2.5,97.5) 
Z P - 
value 
Relative 
Importance 
       
A) Hurdle Model: Binary Response 
GLOBAL MODEL: Capture (Yes/No) ~ Slave-Maker Workers + Host Workers + Host 
Brood + Slave-Maker Workers x Host Workers + Host Workers x Host Brood  
       
Intercept 
 
0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Slave-Maker 
Workers 
3.343 (± 2.427) -1.501, 8.187 1.353 0.176 0.95 
Host Workers 
 
- 2.470 (± 1.891) -6.242, 1.302 1.283 0.199 0.80 
Host Brood 
 
-1.699 (± 1.607) -4.900, 1.503 1.04 0.298 0.46 
S-M x H 
Workers 
1.932 (± 4.526) -7.112, 10.978 0.419 0.675 0.18 
Host W x Brood 3.209 (± 4.687) -6.160, 12.578 0.671 0.502 0.06        
     
B) Hurdle Model: Continuous, Non-Zero Data 
Global Model: Proportion Brood Stolen ~ Slave-Maker Workers + Host Workers + Host 
Brood + Slave-Maker Workers x Host Workers + Host Workers x Host Brood        
Intercept 
 
0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Host Workers 
 
-0.030 (± 0.003) -0.036, -0.023 9.005 <0.001 1.00 
Slave-Maker 
Workers 
0.005 (± 0.003) -0.002, 0.012 1.47 0.141 0.22 
Host Brood 
 
-0.004 (± 0.003) -0.011, 0.003 1.153 0.249 0.20 
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Table 1.3: What contributes to Slave-Maker mortality? Due to zero-inflation, data were 
analyzed in a hurdle Model: (A) First, with mortality as a binary response variable 
(Yes/No), and then, only using only non-zero data, (B) with mortality as a proportion of 
slave-maker colony size and (C) with mortality as a total count per trial. N = 67 trials.       
Parameters 
 
Standardized 
Estimates (±SE) 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
(2.5,97.5) 
Z P - 
value 
Relative 
Importance 
       
A)Hurdle Model: Binary Response 
GLOBAL MODEL: Death (Yes/No) ~ Slave-Maker Workers + Host Workers + Host 
Brood + Slave-Maker Workers x Host Workers + Host Workers x Host Brood  
       
Intercept 
 
0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Slave-Maker 
Workers 1.161 (± 0.669) -0.176,2.500 1.702 0.089 0.84 
Host Workers  1.107 (± 0.740) -0.370,2.584 1.469 0.142 0.70 
Host Brood  0.095 (± 0.700) -1.300,1.486 0.134 0.894 0.20 
S-M x H Workers -0.390 (± 1.593) -3.573,2.794 0.240 0.810 0.12  
     
B) Hurdle Model: Non-Zero Data as Proportion 
Global Model: Proportion Mortality ~ Slave-Maker Workers + Host Workers + Host 
Brood + Slave-Maker Workers x Host Workers + Host Workers x Host Brood        
Intercept 
 
0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Slave-Maker 
Workers -0.161 (± 0.062) -0.288,-0.034 2.490 0.013 1.00 
Host Workers 0.088 (± 0.079) -0.073,0.249 1.075 0.282 0.61 
Host Brood 
 
0.080 (± 0.067) -0.056,0.215 1.157 0.247 0.37 
S-M x H 
Workers 
 
0.072 (± 0.109) -0.150,0.295 0.641 0.521 0.13 
       
C) Hurdle Model: Non-Zero Data as Count 
Global Model: Number of Deaths ~ Slave-Maker Workers + Host Workers + Host Brood 
+ Slave-Maker Workers x Host Workers + Host Workers x Host Brood 
       
Intercept  0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Host Workers  0.148 (± 0.180) -0.218, 0.514 0.793 0.482 0.41 
Slave-Maker 
Workers 0.136 (± 0.162) -0.195, 0.466 0.804 0.421 0.39 
Host Brood  0.156 (± 0.162) -0.174, 0.485 0.927 0.354 0.34 
S-M x H 
Workers 
 
0.242 (± 0.265) -0.300, 0.783 0.876 0.381 0.04 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING IN SLAVE-MAKING ANTS IS OPTIMIZED FOR 
HOST COLONY QUANTITY, NOT QUALITY 
 
Abstract 
While the mechanisms underlying collective decision-making are under intensive study, very 
little is still known about how collective decision-making evolves. Convergent evolution in the 
mechanisms of collective decision-making across taxa and levels of biological organization 
suggest that common principles guide optimal decision strategies. To investigate the role of 
ecology in shaping mechanisms of collective decision-making, I study collective decision-
making the slave-making ant Temnothorax americanus as a contrast to existing model systems.  
T. americanus colonies make collective decisions over where to conduct raids, in which they 
attack heterospecific ant colonies to steal their brood. I begin by describing a colony’s sampling 
tactics and preference function using choice experiments, which show that colonies use a 
sequential-choice strategy with low acceptance thresholds for host colony size. I then investigate 
what suite of ecological conditions have favored the evolution of this decision strategy using 
theory developed for mate choice. I test whether the conditions known to favor sequential-choice 
are met by T. americanus by making behavioral observations of raids and by measuring 
demographics of colonies in the field. The data presented here show that raiding is constrained 
by the timing of host brood development and low encounter rates of host colonies. Variation in 
host nest quality, however, is unlikely to favor low acceptance thresholds of slave-maker 
colonies. The implications of these results are that slave-maker colonies are maximizing their 
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payoff by raiding as many nests as possible, and not by selectively exploiting the few most 
profitable ones.  
Introduction 
 Collective behavior presents a puzzle when adaptive patterns arise from local interactions 
that are not dictated by any single leader or blueprint (Camazine et al. 2001). An analogous 
puzzle exists at the ultimate level, where it is not obvious how selection operates on local 
interactions to generate behaviors that are adaptive (i.e. fitness enhancing) at the group level 
(Sumpter 2010). Even though a mechanistic understanding of collective behavior deepens our 
evolutionary understanding (Boomsma & Franks 2006), we also need to be informed about the 
ecological context of collective behavior if we want to understand how it has been shaped by 
selection (Couzin & Krause 2003, Gordon 2014). Relevant aspects of ecological context may 
include environmental factors, the nature of the group’s problem (e.g finding food, nest-site, 
defense) and the relative weighting of certain trade-offs (e.g speed-accuracy, quality-quantity, 
etc.). By linking ecological context to specific mechanisms of collective behavior, we can begin 
to build a framework for predicting when certain mechanisms will evolve, potentially exposing 
principles governing collective organization. 
 There is already evidence that convergent mechanisms of collective behavior have 
evolved in response to similar problems (Visscher 2007, Marshall et al. 2009, Jeanson & 
Deneubourg 2009, Reid et al. 2015). The most well-studied example of convergence occurs in 
the problem of nest-site selection, in which both colonies of honeybees and ants reach collective 
decisions over new nest sites using convergent processes (e.g. independent assessment of 
options, positive feedback via recruitment, cross inhibition and quorum sensing; reviewed in 
Visscher 2007). Even outside of the context of nest-site selection, comparable processes take 
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place between neurons in the mammalian brain during sensory processing (Shadlen & Newsome 
2001) and in groups of microbes during the production of virulence factors (Ross-Gillespie & 
Kümmerli 2014). The similarities in how these disparate systems make decisions are of interest 
because they suggest that selection has repeatedly arrived at the same solution to the problem of 
collective decision-making. To what extent do these similarities represent optimal solutions that 
generalize beyond the details unique to each system’s ecology and basic biology?  
 One shared feature among these different systems is their use of the best-of-n decision 
strategy (Visscher 2007, Seeley & Buhrman 2001, Shadlen & Newsome 2001), which involves 
sampling the environment and selecting the best option among all sampled possibilities. While 
certain ecological conditions are known to favor the best-of-n decision strategy over others, such 
as  the sequential choice strategy (Janetos 1980, Real 1990), it remains unclear to what extent the 
specific details of each system’s ecology and basic biology will fine tune the mechanisms of 
decision-making within a given decision-making strategy. For example, the relative importance 
of speed over accuracy (Chittka et al. 2009) in a given problem will certainly shape the 
mechanisms that promote or hinder speed in any decision-making strategy.  
 The question of how ecology shapes mechanisms of collective decision-making remains 
relatively unexplored because work in the field of animal behavior has focused predominantly on 
nest-site selection in social insects (Visscher 2007), a problem that is fundamentally similar 
across the systems studied so far. To investigate the role of specific ecological factors in shaping 
mechanisms of collective decision-making, I investigate collective decision-making in a novel 
context by studying a slave-making ant. Slave-making ant colonies make collective decisions 
over where to conduct a raid, during which the slave-maker colony attacks a host colony to steal 
the young (i.e brood; Hölldobler & Wilson 1990, Buschinger 2009). As with nest–site selection, 
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brood raiding requires that a colony select a specific location in the local environment and 
physically go to there as a group. However, brood raiding may differ in that the trade-offs among 
variables, such as time, energy expenditure, accuracy and risk, may be weighed differently given 
that raiding is a more short-term decision and includes the risks of combat (Franks & Partridge 
1993; Kleeburg et al. 2014). Taking advantage of the similarities and differences from nest-site 
selection, I investigated the mechanisms of raid-site selection to create an informative 
comparison. 
 I focus this study on Temnothorax americanus, an obligate slave-making ant native to the 
temperate forests of eastern North America (Wesson 1939, Alloway 1979, Alloway & Del Rio 
Pesado 1983).  As a first step, I investigated the decision-making strategy (i.e. best-of-n versus 
sequential choice) used by slave-making ant colonies over where to initiate a raid. Since 
decision-making strategies are defined by both sampling tactics and preference functions 
(Widemo & Saether 1999), I examined both in T. americanus colonies using choice experiments. 
If colonies sample multiple different options before initiating a raid at the most preferred option, 
even if the best option is found first, then they satisfy the predictions of the best-of-n strategy. If, 
however, colonies choose the first option they encounter that meets a quality threshold, then they 
exhibit a sequential choice decision strategy. A distinguishing prediction between these two 
strategies is that colonies may chose the first nest they found in sequential choice, but not in best-
of-n. Finally, colonies may also exhibit a strategy of universal acceptance, which predicts 
colonies will always raid the first nest they find.  
 Prior work suggests that slave-maker colonies maximize their net pay-off from a raid 
(maximizing brood acquired while minimizing mortality) by targeting host colonies of 
intermediate size (Miller, in prep). To achieve the highest payoffs, I expected slave-maker 
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colonies to display a stabilizing preference function (i.e. where extreme values are considered 
unfavorable; Edward 2015, Jennions & Petrie 1997) and to enact a best-of-n decision-making 
strategy that locates these best nests. But, contrary to these expectations, experiments detailed 
here revealed that slave-maker colonies are non-choosy, and deviate from the best-of-n strategy 
that is widely used in nest-site selection. These findings raise the additional question of why 
slave-maker colonies are not more selective in their decisions over where to raid. 
 Extensive theoretical and empirical work on mate choice (Real 1990, Janetos 1980, 
Jennions & Petrie 1997), optimal foraging (Stephens & Krebs 1986) and acceptance thresholds 
(Reeve 1989) have established a general framework to predict which ecological conditions 
should favor different acceptance thresholds and sampling tactics. According to the hypotheses 
proposed by the above decision-making models, non-choosiness is expected to evolve under the 
following conditions: (1) when the search costs are high (Real 1990), which may manifest as low 
encounter rates (Reeve 1989) or high time constraints (Janetos 1980); or (2) when the variability 
in the quality of the options is low (Real 1990) or unpredictable across patches (Stephens & 
Krebs 1986). To test how well T. americanus colonies meet the conditions for low-choosiness, I 
first tested the prediction that encounter rates are low by measuring the latency to discover host 
colonies and their spatial distribution in the field. To place the encounter rates in a temporal 
context, and test the prediction that time constraints are high, I also measured the duration of the 
time period that host brood are available to steal. To account for the possibility that time 
constraints could also come from the slave-maker colony, I compared the timing of slave-maker 
worker brood development in relation to host brood availability.  To test the non-mutually 
exclusive hypothesis that low or unpredictable variability in the quality of host colonies favors 
low choosiness, I mapped and censused the contents of host colonies in the wild.  
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 In summary, I distinguish which strategy of decision-making slave-making colonies 
employ in decisions over where to raid host colonies. In addition, I evaluate the role of spatial 
and temporal ecology in shaping selection on the strategy of collective decision-making in T. 
americanus. 
 
Methods 
Colony Collection and Maintenance 
 Temnothorax americanus uses three host species: T. longispinosus, T. ambiguus, and T. 
curvispinosus. The populations measured in this study consisted almost exclusively of T. 
longispinosus hosts colonies, thus all experimental host colonies were T. longispinosus. Slave-
make and host colonies were collected at the Huyck Preserve (42° 30' 53.7876", -74° 8' 
27.7836"), Cornell Natural Areas (42° 27' 55.2738", -76° 26' 34.299"), Black Rock Forest (41° 
25' 11.64'' , -74° 0' 33.48'' ) and Bear Mountain State Park (41° 18' 33.976", -74° 0' 14.680") 
between April and October, 2013 – 2016. Colonies were transported back to Liddell Labs in 
Ithaca, NY in Ziploc bags and stored in a refrigerator (4ºC) for up to three weeks before being 
censused for the following: queens, workers, mature sexuals, larvae, and pupae (worker and 
sexual).  
 Immediately after being censused, each colony was allowed to move itself into an 
artificial nest. Artificial nests consisted of a piece of balsa wood or plexiglass (2.5 mm thick) 
with a circle cut-out to form the interior cavity (22 mm in diameter) and a slit along one side to 
serve as the entrance (2 mm x 4 mm). This structure was placed between 2 microscope slides (5 
cm x 7.5 cm) secured with masking tape and then wrapped in aluminum foil to exclude light. 
Each colony was housed in a separate plastic Ziploc box (15 cm x 15 cm x 6 cm) with a plaster 
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floor, which was moistened twice per week to maintain humidity levels. Colonies were fed a 
teaspoon of Bhatkar diet twice per week and housed in a room at 26ºC, with a 14L:10D day:light 
cycle. 
Two-choice Trials 
 I conducted two-choice tests of slave-maker preference for host colony size in rectangular 
glass arenas measuring 45cm x 25cm (Fig 2.1A). The rims of the 13 cm high walls were coated 
with Vaseline to prevent ants from escaping.  I placed a slave-maker colony at one end of the 
arena, and on the opposite wall (~40 cm away), I placed two host (T. longispinosus) colonies: 
one with 25 workers and the other with 50 workers; colonies were matched for brood with a 
mixture of larvae and pupae for a total of 25 brood items. Host colonies occupied an acorn or 
hickory nut with a single entry hole that never exceeded 2 mm. In each trial, both options were 
presented in the same conditions, either in acorns or hickory nuts, but I alternated which corner 
(left or right) the host colonies occupied between trials.  
 On the morning of a raiding trial, the room temperature was elevated to 30ºC, and a food 
dish and wet cotton were placed in the center of the arena to prevent dehydration or starvation 
during the trials. Immediately after placing colonies in the arena, I video recorded the entire 
arena from above with a webcam (Logitech C920 HD Pro). By 16:00 EST, if there were no 
slave-makers recruiting to or attacking a target nest, then the session was terminated and the 
colonies were removed from the glass arena and returned to their boxes until the next day. The 
colonies were given a maximum of five days to initiate a raid before the trial was aborted. If 
there was evidence of recruitment or a raid (i.e. a host nest was vacated, there was a raiding party 
in the arena, or slave-makers were entering or exiting a host nest), I left the colonies in the arena 
overnight to complete brood transport and collected them the next morning, so that colonies 
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stayed in the arena for 24 (±4) hours. The raiding room was set to the same 14L:10D lighting 
regime as the room housing colonies, and I lowered the temperature to 26ºC during darkness. 
The morning following a raiding attempt, I dissected both host nests and the slave-maker nest to 
determine which host nest had been raided and whether the raid had been successful. I also 
watched videos of each raid to determine the time at which each nest was discovered and raided. 
A raid was defined as initiated when at least one slave-maker ant entered a nest and sent the host 
colony into alarm. Between trials, the floor and lower walls of the arena were washed with 
acetone and a paper-towel to remove any chemical cues. 
 Prior to raids, all slave-maker colonies experienced the same conditions to standardize 
colony state, since this might influence raiding behaviors. Two days prior to raiding, I removed 
all brood and some adult slaves from the colony so that there was a 1:1 ratio of slave-makers 
(including the queen) to slaves. Excess slaves were relocated to a temporary nest without slave-
makers until after the raiding trial was complete. During the removals, each slave-maker worker 
was individually marked with RC Car Pactra Paint, with dots on the abdomen, thorax and head. 
Ants were isolated in vials for at least four hours while the paint dried before being reintroduced 
to the rest of the colony. Two days later, slave-maker colonies were used in raiding trials. 
 To assess T. americanus colonies’ preference for host colony size, I compared raiding 
choices using a chi-square goodness of fit test. All statistical analyses were performed in R 
version 3.1.2. Choice was scored as the first nest the colony chose to raid.  To test that the 
preference function depends on the slave-maker’s colony size, I compared raiding preference 
against slave-maker colony size using a logistic regression.  
 To determine which decision-make strategy T. americanus colonies employ, I recorded 
searching and nest discovery events prior to each raid. The best-of-n model predicts that slave-
40 
 
maker colonies will sample both nests before raiding, whereas the sequential choice model 
predicts that slave-makers may raid the first nest they find. 
Microcosm 
 I created a microcosm of the raiding environment by filling plastic collapsible swimming 
pools (240 cm diameter) with ca. 3 cm of moist top soil and then coating the pool’s rim with 
Vaseline to prevent ants from escaping. I placed a single slave-maker colony in the center and 
arranged 8 host colonies to surround it (Fig 2.1B). The microcosm included four small host 
colonies (10 workers, 10 brood) and four large host colonies (50 workers, 50 brood). They were 
placed either near (38 cm) or far (107cm) from the central slave-maker colony to create four 
classes of host options. I arranged colonies so that there was an equal number of large and small 
ones at both near and far distances. Each colony was housed in the plexiglass nests described 
above. I checked the contents of each colony’s nest daily at the same time for three weeks. I 
judged a raid to have taken place if on a given day both the slave-maker nest contained brood 
and a host’s nest was either empty or had reduced brood. 
 Prior to placing a slave-maker colony in the arena, all of its larvae or slave pupae were 
removed from its nest so that newly acquired brood from raids could be readily identified. Care 
was taken to avoid using host nests from the same collecting locality within a trial to prevent the 
problem of ants from the same polydomous colony from reuniting in the same nest structure and 
disrupting the treatment options. To standardize slave-maker colonies, I selected colonies that 
contained six slave-maker workers and adjusted the T. longispinosus slave number to 24. 
 I positioned eight plastic dishes each containing a tablespoon of Bhatkar diet evenly 
throughout the arena and replaced them with fresh food once per week. Water was added to the 
soil ad libitum to keep it visibly moist. Two microcosm habitats were in the same room as the lab 
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colonies so they automatically experienced the same day/night cycles and temperature. The three 
remaining microcosm habitats occupied different rooms, but all five microcosm arenas 
experienced the same temperature and day/night for cycle.  
 To characterize preference function for host colony size, I compared each slave-maker 
colony’s raiding choices using a chi-square goodness of fit test, in which each nest has equal 
probability of being raided. Although some slave-maker colonies raided multiple host colonies 
over several weeks, only the host colony chosen on a slave-maker colony’s first raid was used to 
calculate preference. In three trials, the slave-maker colony raided two nests in one day, and both 
raids were counted in the chi-square tests as separate choices. I also counted the rate at which 
raids took place to test predictions of different sampling and decision strategies.  
Field Plots 
 I searched for slave-maker colonies in natural areas that had not undergone collection 
prior to my census to ensure naturalistic measures of nest density and distribution. These areas 
were the same as my collecting sites: including the Cornell Natural Areas, the Black Rock Forest 
and Bear Mountain State Park. I mapped each plot by marking the area within a 3 m radius of a 
slave-maker colony’s nest and systematically opening every possible nesting structure. It is 
unknown at what maximum distance slave-makers will conduct raids, but I have observed 
natural raids in the field at approximately 3 m from a slave-maker colony’s nest; it is possible 
that colonies raid at greater distances. When either a T. longispinosus or T. americanus nest was 
found, I poured the nest contents into a Ziploc bag with a handful of leaf-litter for later census 
and placed a flag where the nest had been found. After I had searched the whole area, I measured 
the distance of each flag from the center of the plot, i.e. where the slave-maker colony’s nest was 
located, using a laser distance measure (Bosch, DLR130K) and measured the angle using a 
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digital compass on an iPhone 6. Ziploc bags were stored in a refrigerator (4ºC) for up to two 
weeks before the contents of each nest were recorded: number of queens, workers, and brood 
type.  
Testing Predictions of Decision Strategies 
(1) Encounter rates 
 To evaluate the prediction that encounter rates will be low for slave-maker colonies under 
natural conditions, I derived a hypothetical field encounter rate based on lab and field 
observations. I derived the mean discovery rate in videos of the two-choice trials by calculating 
the time between when the first scout leaves home and when a host colony is first discovered (n 
= 13 trials). The density of nests in the two-choice trials in a 45 cm x 25 cm arena was 17.78 
nests per square meter. I also calculated the mean density of host colony nests in the field using 
data from the field plots census by dividing the number of host colony nests at each plot by the 
area of the plot (ᴨ*(3m)2 = 28.274 m2).  
(2) Time Constraints 
 To evaluate the prediction that time constraints limit the selection of a host colony, I 
collected host nests from the three locations indicated above over the course of the warm season, 
between 11 April and 14 September 2013 – 2016. I created a brood development timeline by 
counting the number of larvae and pupae, and their relative proportions, within each nest at the 
time of collection. I did the same for slave-maker colonies between 29 May and 25 August 
during the same years and from the same locations. I pooled the data from all locations and years 
to maximize the continuity of the data over the course of the season.  
 To test whether slave-makers are developmentally ahead of their hosts in terms of brood 
development, I ran a permutation test by doing the following. First, I built a second order 
43 
 
polynomial regression (quadratic), using the “lm” function in the R “stats” package, with 
proportion of brood as the dependent variable and day of the year as the predictor. Using the 
resulting best-fit equation (intercept and coefficients) using the “polynomial” function in the 
“polynom” R-package (Venables et al. 2016), I solved for the day at which the curve is a 
maximum (i.e. when the derivative is equal to zero). I repeated this for both the slave-maker and 
host nests, and then calculated the difference between peaks (day of host max – day of slave-
maker max), such that a positive value indicated host development lagging behind that of slave-
makers.  To run the permutation test, I randomly assigned species identity across the data-set 
using the “runif” function in the “stats” package in R, and recalculated the difference between 
species in 999 permutations to create a null frequency distribution of differences with which to 
compare the original value.  
 I also tested whether species identity was a significant predictor of how the proportion of 
pupae varies with time by running a GLMM and model selection with AICc criteria using the 
“MuMin” package in R (Barton 2016). The global GLMM had a binomial distribution to allow 
the response variable to be a two vector proportion. The model’s fixed effects were day, species 
ID and their interaction and the random effects were year and location. To compare the effect 
sizes between variables, I standardized beta-coefficients by multiplying the raw beta-coefficients 
from the model by the variable’s standard deviation.  
(3) Quality Distribution within Plots 
 To evaluate the prediction that variation in the quality of options is low, I calculated the 
variance-to mean-ratios, the interquartile ranges, and the coefficients of variation for each of the 
mapped field plots.  
(4) Variability between plots (predictability) 
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 To evaluate the level of variability, and thus predictability, between plots, I compared the 
variation in host colony nest contents between the mapped field plots. I calculated the mean and 
standard error of the following: the number of nests per plot, the number of workers and brood 
per nest per plot, and the total number of brood and workers per plot. I also calculated the 
variance-to-mean ratio for the total brood and workers across plots to describe the variation 
between plots. Finally, I conducted Levene’s to statistically test for homogeneity of variance 
across plots, using both the total number of brood and the total number of workers between plots.  
 
Results 
Choice Trials: Two-choice 
Slave-maker colonies demonstrated no preference when presented with a binary choice between 
large (50 workers) and small (25 workers) host colonies. I conducted 19 trials using 18 slave-
maker colonies, but video records of the raids were available for 15 of them. Although video was 
unavailable for these four trials, slave-maker preference could be determined in three of them 
because the colony raided only one nest; however, the lack of video made it impossible to 
determine whether these slave-maker colonies ever found both nests. In 63% (12/19) of trials, 
both host colonies were raided within a 24 hour period. Considering only the colony’s first 
choice, slave-makers demonstrated no preference in host colony size (Fig. 2.1A; Chi-square = 0, 
df = 1, p = 1.0), and choice was independent of slave-maker colony size (i.e. number of slave-
maker workers; logistic regression, p = 0.305, βsize = 0.01789, R2 = 0.010, df = 13). Contrary to 
the prediction for the best-of-n strategy, slave-maker colonies raided the first nest they found in 
73% (11/15) of the trials. When both nests were found prior to the raid (4/15 trials), the larger 
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colony was chosen in three out of four trials. In these three cases, the smaller colony was found 
first, and the reverse is true in the one case where the small colony was chosen.  
Choice Trials: Microcosms 
 Seven out of the 11 microcosm replicates had evidence of raids. Considering the first 
raiding choices only (i.e. that occurred within a 24 hour period), four out of seven microcosms 
raided one nest at a time, but the remaining three microcosms raided two nests in one day, so 
these raids were pooled for a total of ten raids. Slave-maker colonies did not preferentially raid 
one type of target nest over the others (Fig. 2.1B; Chi-square = 4.4, df = 3, p = 0.221) and there 
was no preference for size class regardless of distance (Chi-square = 0.4, df = 1, p = 0.527). 
Although colonies tended to raid near nests over far ones, this trend was not significant (Chi-
square = 3.6, df = 1, p = 0.058).  
 Indicators of sampling tactic did not support one model over another. On average, slave-
maker colonies took 2.7 ± 0.75 days to raid from the start of the experiment (range = 1 – 7), not 
including colonies that never raided. Five out of the seven slave-maker colonies raided a second 
time a mean 1.0 day later (range = 0 - 4), and three colonies raided a third time a mean 3.0 days 
later (range = 1 – 5).  
Testing Predictions of Decision Strategies 
(1) Encounter rates 
 The hypothetical rate at which slave-maker workers are expected to encounter host nests 
in the field is low, taking 7 days, 7 hours, 48 min to find one nest (632889 sec/nest) on average 
(see Table 2.1 for derivation), with a hypothetical minimum of 3d, 7h, 33m and maximum of 
11d, 8h, 29m, as derived from the lower and upper confidence intervals of lab search time. The 
confidence interval of encounter rates is comparable when substituting the upper and lower 
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bounds of field density instead: Lower = 5d, 12h, 20m (476427.5 sec); Upper = 10d, 21h, 51m 
(942718.3 sec). This encounter rate is relatively low the context of time available to raid, which 
is detailed below. 
(2) Time Constraints 
 The time period during which slave-makers may gain larvae or pupae is limited to about 
90 days in New York state (~May 15th to ~August 20th; Fig 2.2C). Although larvae are available 
throughout this period, the proportion of brood that are pupae is at a maximum for roughly 60 
days (~June 15th to ~August 15th; Fig 2.2B). When considering the total quantities of brood (both 
larvae and pupae), brood numbers peak for ca. 50 days (~30 May to ~ 20th July 20th), and the 
overlap between peaks in total brood number and the proportion that are pupae occurs for ca. 35 
days (June 15th – July 20th). 
 The timing of brood development in slave-maker colonies coincides with the peaks in 
pupal abundance in host colonies. The proportion of brood that were pupae was fit to a quadratic 
function in both slave-maker (p = 0.011, R2 = 0.039, F(2,174) = 4.583, Fig 2.2A) and host nests (p 
< 0.001, R2 = 0.464,  F(2, 313) = 137.2; Fig 2.2B). Slave-maker pupae mature earlier than those of 
their hosts’ by approximately 30 days (Fig 2.2 A & B), and this difference is significant 
according to the permutation test (p = 0.022, N=999 permutations).  Model selection of a GLMM 
of the same data confirm that species identity and day of the year, and their interaction, were 
significant predictors of the proportion of a colony’s brood that were pupae (global model: 
weight = 1, AICc = 8839.4). Species ID also had the largest effect size (βSpecies =  -141.237, βDay 
=  -0.001105194, βDay*Sp = 0.07035971). 
(3) Quality Distribution 
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 The quality distribution of nests within a plot tends to be over-dispersed, contrary to the 
prediction that variation in the quality will be under-dispersed when acceptance thresholds are 
low. The index of dispersion (variance-to-mean ratio) for each plot is greater than 1 for nest 
contents in terms of both brood and workers (Table 2.2). Other measures of variation, including 
interquartile range and the coefficient of variation, are consistent with relatively high levels of 
variation between nests within a plot. 
(4) Variability between plots (predictability) 
 The variation between plots in the quality and abundance of nest options is moderate, but 
not statistically significant. Across all plots (n=9), there are 6 (± 0.8 SE) nests per plot and the 
mean host nest contains 25.7 (±2.6) workers and 35.9 (±3.9) brood items (Fig 2.3). The mean 
total number of workers per plot is 154.2 (±92.4) and the mean total number of brood is 215.7 
(±39.2).  The variance-to-mean ratio between plots is 64.13 for brood and is 14.93 for workers. 
In terms of brood, the variation between plots is marginally significantly different (Levene’s test: 
p =  0.050, df = 8, F =2.0881, n= 63), and not at all significant for the number of workers (p = 
0.440, df = 8, F= 1.007, n = 61). 
 
Discussion 
 The collective decisions-making strategies of slave-making ant colonies were described 
and classified according to their preference function and sampling tactics. Raiding patterns from 
the two experiments suggest that slave-makers use a low acceptance threshold for nest size, with 
a preference function that accepts nests with as few as 10 workers. Given prior work (Miller, in 
prep), slave-maker colonies were expected to prefer nests containing 50 workers over those 
containing 25 or 10 because of the expected higher payoff from larger nests. However, slave-
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maker colonies do not demonstrate a preference for any nest size in both the two-choice and the 
microcosm experiments. Colonies demonstrate a slight preference for closer nests in the 
microcosm, suggesting that distance might be a more important attribute than size. In spite of 
this pattern, this non-significant trend does not distinguish between a bias in encounter 
probability and true preference, since workers from host colonies may leave chemical cues of 
their presence by walking around the nest exterior (Wüst & Menzel 2016).  
 Observations of searching and discovery rates from the same experiments solidly reject 
the best-of-n decision model.  As predicted by the sequential choice model, slave-makers 
frequently raided the first nest to be discovered in the two-choice experiment (73% of trials) and 
often raid both if given the time, suggesting instead an opportunistic strategy. It is unlikely that 
slave-makers are using a best-of-n strategy because of the rarity with which slave-maker colonies 
discover more than one nest prior to mounting an attack (26% of trials), and thus do not have the 
opportunity to make comparisons. Results from the microcosm also support either a sequential 
choice model or a universal acceptance model, in that slave-makers raided multiple nests within 
a single search period. Although about half of the microcosms had raids spaced several days 
apart, this may be due to low encounter rates rather than lengthy deliberation periods. While the 
results point to a sequential choice strategy, they do not firmly distinguish from the universal 
acceptance model. The experiments here do not explore the lower range of the acceptance 
threshold, so it is unclear if such a threshold exists and where it lies. Furthermore, the fact that 
slave-maker colonies rejected the first host colony they found, although in rare cases, more 
strongly supports a sequential-choice strategy over universal acceptance.  
 To address the ultimate reasons why slave-maker colonies employ this strategy, I tested 
for conditions that favor low acceptance thresholds as predicted by mate choice theories. Low 
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acceptance thresholds are predicted to evolve when encounter rates are low (Reeve 1989, 
Jennions & Petrie 1997), and this is consistent with the rate at which scouts from slave-maker 
colonies encounter host nests. Hypothetical encounter rates were calculated from measures of 
host nest density in the field and encounter rates in raiding arenas of the two-choice experiments. 
These derived rates revealed that it might take on average up to seven days before the colony 
finds a single nest. At that rate, colonies would need to wait an additional 7 days before finding a 
second nest with which to make a comparison. Whether this encounter rate is small or large 
depends on the time period during which colonies have to make such comparisons and reach 
decisions. 
 Results on the phenology of brood development show that raiding is bound by high time 
constraints. Encounter rates are thus very low relative to the time available for raiding. The 
period during which moderately developed brood is available to steal, lasting about 50 days (Fig 
2.2C), is relatively brief compared to the time needed to find multiple nests and make 
comparisons. This raiding window is even shorter, about 35 days, if slave-maker colonies limit 
their raiding to periods when the abundance of pupae is at its highest (Fig 2.2B). At the end of 
this raiding window, the available pupae will have matured into adults, diminishing the value of 
host colonies by increasing the number of defending workers and reducing the brood to steal 
(Miller, in prep). If slave-maker colonies take seven days on average to find a nest and they have 
between 50 and 35 days of optimal raiding time, then colonies could raid between five and seven 
colonies over the course of this period if they raided every nest they found. This raiding 
frequency is closely matched by estimates derived from genotyping slave workers in T. 
americanus colonies, which estimates six raids per season (Foitzik & Herbers 2001).  Given 
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these calculations, delaying raids in order to make the comparisons required by a best-of-n 
strategy results in high opportunity costs.  
 Further evidence that brood phenology is an important feature in the life-history of slave-
maker colonies is in the relative timing of slave-maker and host brood maturation.  I present 
correlative evidence that slave-maker pupae mature into adults at the time when host pupae 
approach maximum abundance. This asynchrony in brood development provides slave-makers a 
boost in colony size with which to conduct raids, and poises them to take full advantage of this 
peak in host pupae. The closeness in timing of these phenological events highlights the relevance 
of timing in the slave-maker system, and has been important in other social parasites, as well 
(Wcislo 1987). 
 In addition, low acceptance thresholds are predicted to evolve when there is low 
variability in the quality of different options (Real 1990). Data on field demographics, however, 
show that variability is not in the direction predicted for low acceptance thresholds. On the 
contrary, the quality distributions of host nests are highly variable. As a result, the opportunity to 
find higher quality nests through continued searching exists and is unlikely to be the reason that 
slave-maker colonies have low acceptance thresholds. While variability within plots is expected 
to play a role, so is variability between plots. Low predictability in the number and/or quality of 
options is expected to favor low acceptance thresholds and reduced sampling rates.  This 
prediction is moderately supported, as the variation between plots is relatively high in terms of 
the number of brood available per plot.  
 In summary, these results show that the costs of searching play a major role in shaping 
decision-strategies, but that the quality distribution is relatively less important. The implications 
of these results are that slave-maker colonies are optimizing their payoff by raiding as many 
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nests as possible, and not by selecting only the most profitable ones, as was initially expected. It 
would be of interest to see whether such time constraints are relaxed in other regions within the 
range of this species (Kleeberg et al. 2015). For example, longer warm seasons in the more 
southern range could create the opportunity for a second round or extended period of pupal 
abundance in the host colonies. Reduced time constraints could favor more choosy slave-maker 
colonies, but this assumes other ecological factors, like food abundance or quality distribution, 
remain fixed. It would also be interesting to see whether other species of slave-making ants are 
equally non-choosy and follow a similar decision-making strategy, especially in species with 
larger colony sizes. As obligate social parasites, T. americanus have small colony sizes relative 
to their non-parasitic counterparts (Wesson 1939), which helps explain their low encounter rates 
on a mechanistic level. If finding a host nest is so time consuming, it begs the question why 
slave-maker colonies are not larger to increase discovery rates. However, the advantages of 
increasing slave-maker worker production may not pay if they outweigh the benefits of the 
parasitic life-style, in which more energy is devoted to producing reproductives in place of 
workers. 
 Although I was unable to find evidence of complex information processing by the colony 
as a whole, distributed processing may still be of interest in other systems of sequential choice. 
In some cases, sequential choice may still require that groups integrate and evaluate options from 
multiple sources, following a threshold preference function. The way in which a threshold is 
encoded by a distributed system is not intuitive, and could still be of worthwhile study in systems 
where it is expected. Such systems would include cases where there is a low cost of searching, 
high variability between options or when the costs of assessing variation are high. For instance, 
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foraging via group recruitment (Dornhaus & Powell 2010) is less likely to be limited by seasonal 
time constraints and can thus afford to have a higher acceptance threshold.  
 Future research into the evolution of collective behavior, whether it be decision-making, 
regulation or construction, should carefully consider the specific currency that selection is 
optimizing in shaping collective traits. In addition, they should consider how to classify 
collective behaviors in terms of their behavioral strategies for the purpose of more fruitful 
comparisons across taxa. Much work is yet to be done to disentangle the mechanistic generalities 
that give rise to collective behaviors across systems and which mechanisms results from the 
idiosyncrasies unique to each species. 
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Figure 2.1: Physical lay-outs of both choice experiments (below) and the results of each (above). 
In both experiments, choice was defined as the first nest to be raided. (A) The 2-choice 
experiment gave a slave-maker colony a choice between two host colonies containing 25 
workers or 50 workers (n = 16). (B) The microcosm experiment gave a slave-maker colony the 
choice between colonies of two sizes (50 or 10 workers) placed at near and far distances (n = 7). 
Close nests containing 50 workers were selected most frequently, followed by close nests 
containing 10 workers, although there were not significant.  
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Figure 2.2: Data on brood are plotted with respect to day of the year so that brood abundance 
can be tracked across the season. Data from three years and three locations are pooled, and 
location is indicated by color. (A) The proportion of brood that were worker pupae in slave-
maker nests is fit to a quadratic function and 95% confidence intervals are shown in grey. The 
predicted value at which the proportion of pupae are at a maximum is day 168. (B) The 
proportion of brood that were worker pupae in host nests is fit to a quadratic function. The 
predicted value at which the proportion of pupae are at a maximum is day 198. (C) The total 
number of brood, including larvae and both worker and sexual pupae, is plotted over time. 
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Figure 2.3: Maps representing field plots depict the spatial arrangement and abundance of host 
nests surrounding a slave-maker nest within a 3m radius.  
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Table 2.1: Values for host density and encounter rates with host nests are tabulated for lab and 
field data. Encounter rate in the field (in bold) is calculated from the actual values, summarized 
in this table. The bottom row details the calculations used to derive field encounter rates. 
 LAB Field 
Host Nest Density 17.78 nests/m2 
0.21 nests/ m2 
SE = ± 0.03 
Encounter Rate 
(i.e. time to discovery) 
7476 sec/nest 
SE = ± 1880.5 
632889 sec/nest 
Upper 95% CI =980965.7 sec/nest  
Lower 95% CI = 286394.3 sec/nest 
Calculations 
 
Field Encounter Rate * Field  Density = Lab Encounter Rate * Lab Density 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 7476
sec
nests
∗ 17.78
𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑚2
∗
1𝑚2
0.21 𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: For each field plot, three measures of the variation in host nest contents are 
summarized in terms of worker and brood counts. 
Plot 
ID 
WORKER 
Number of workers per nest 
 
BROOD 
Number of brood per nest 
VMR 
Variance-to-
Mean Ratio 
Interquartile 
range 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
(SD/mean) 
VMR 
Variance-to-
Mean Ratio 
Interquartile 
range 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
(SD/mean) 
A 19.20 22.8 0.914 6.90 17.5 0.516 
B 1.49 13.0 0.269 3.38 24.0 0.341 
C 2.64 8.0 0.286 8.04 33.0 0.449 
D 6.73 19.0 0.807 15.96 36.0 0.636 
E 19.78 43.0 0.707 10.41 35.0 0.601 
F 13.26 40.5 0.652 43.61 82.0 0.938 
G 8.04 25.0 0.680 17.58 51.5 0.743 
H 11.96 29.5 0.706 26.80 64.5 0.851 
I 24.99 46.0 0.875 34.44 78.3 0.728 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CONFLICTING GENETIC INTERESTS IMPAIR COLLECTIVE RAIDING BEHAVIORS IN 
SLAVE-MAKING ANT COLONIES 
Abstract 
The process by which collective behaviors evolve is non-intuitive, since selection most often acts 
on individual units to favor group-level phenotypes. Theory predicts that cooperation is an 
essential ingredient to align genetic interests and facilitate selection at the group level. Here I test 
this prediction by investigating the extent to which collective behavior depends on cooperation 
levels. Using the collective raiding behavior of a slave-making ant, I explore the corollary 
prediction that selfish behavior impairs group performance. I manipulated cooperation levels in 
slave-maker colonies by elevating worker reproduction, and measured their performance in raids 
staged in the lab. I also characterized the shape of the benefit function for raiding and describe 
the sub-tasks of ‘herding’ and ‘door guarding’ associated with raiding in an attempt to link 
changes in individual behaviors to collective outcomes. Elevated worker reproduction led to a 
shift in raiding strategy: scouts raided solitary rather than as a collective. Although selfish 
colonies did not recruit nest-mates, they gained commensurate quantities of brood as control 
colonies. The raiding benefit function adopted a concave down shape, with the gains at their 
greatest when there were at least two slave-maker workers. However, the frequency of door 
guarding was a more important predictor of raiding success than was raiding party size. The 
results here illustrate that selfishness can interfere with the expression of collective behavior, but 
that the resiliency of a collective behavior to selfishness may stabilize defection and limit 
selection at the group level. Establishing if and how conflicting genetic interests impairs 
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collective behavior will be a critical first step in understanding how collective behaviors evolve 
as group-level adaptations.   
 
Introduction 
 Despite extensive work to elucidate the mechanisms that give rise to collective animal 
behaviors, relatively less is understood about how collective behaviors evolve. By classifying 
collective behaviors as either ‘cooperative’ and ‘coordinating,’ Sumpter (2010) brings to light 
the different ways selection may shape collective behaviors as they relate to individual 
behaviors.  In cooperative collective behaviors, individuals have evolved to perform a costly task 
because they gain a net benefit from the outcome of the collective behavior itself. This type of 
collective behavior is characteristic of social insect colonies, like ants or termites, where 
altruistic workers gain indirect benefits from novel functions provided by a collective behavior 
(Hölldobler & Wilson 2009). In the other class, coordinating collective behaviors, individuals 
produce a collective behavior as a by-product of acting in their own self-interests. The costs that 
an individual pays to perform the behavior are repaid as a direct benefit from coordinating with 
the group, but individuals have not evolved costly behavior specifically to optimize group 
performance. Some examples of coordinating collective behaviors include the synchronized 
movement of schools of fish and flocks of birds, where an individual reduces its chances of 
predation by coordinating its movement with the group, but has no genetic interests in how well 
another fish blends in with the group’s movement (Ioannou et al. 2012). Sumpter’s (2010) 
classification system is useful in that it clarifies the role of aligning genetic interests for the 
evolution of collective behaviors. Similar points have been made in in the context of the major 
evolutionary transitions, in which aligning genetic interests is thought to facilitate the joining of 
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lower level units into groups that are defined by their collective traits (Maynard-Smith & 
Szathmáry 1995). One of the major drivers of this shift in selection is the promotion of 
cooperation and the elimination of competition (Michod & Herron 2006).   
 Despite these theoretical arguments, competition is still a divisive feature common to 
many social groups (Bourke 2011, Ratnieks & Reeve 1992), and still exerts influence even in 
highly cooperative groups (Boomsma & Franks 2006). Given the abundance of examples where 
individual genetic interests are neither completely aligned nor completely opposing, the 
dichotomy proposed by Sumpter (2010) fits better as two ends along a spectrum. The effects of 
cooperation and competition on collective behaviors in the middle regions of this spectrum are 
almost completely unstudied and it remains unknown how collective behaviors take shape in the 
face of the opposing genetic interests. While a few studies have established that conflict has costs 
to group-level efficiency (in social insects – Mattila et al. 2012, Cole 1986; slime molds – Foster 
et al. 2002), there has been no work to date that analyzes the influence of conflicting genetic 
interests on the expression of collective behaviors in cooperative groups. In cases where 
conflicting interests in collective behavior have been considered, studies are limited to classes of 
‘coordinating’ collective behaviors, where individual level selection dominates. For example, 
studies on how troops of baboons (Strandburg-Peshkin et al. 2015) reconcile conflicting 
preferences about the direction of group movement have shown that individuals compromise to 
maximizes group cohesion to maintain the benefits of group living; but the benefits of group 
living are not achieved via the movement per se. Existing empirical work, therefore, cannot tell 
us how such conflict interest will affect the evolution of collective behaviors in otherwise 
cooperative groups.  
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 In the theoretical realm, however, there has been more progress on this question. Within-
group variation in costly cooperation has been the central focus in models of public goods games 
and collective action problems (Frank 2010, Gavrilets & Fortunato 2014), but this work has not 
been extended to the study of collective behaviors specifically. Furthermore, predictions from 
these models are limited in their scope because they do not take in to account biologically 
relevant factors, like the effect relatedness within groups (Gavrilets 2015). Most existing models 
predict that the highest ranking individuals should invest the most cooperative effort in collective 
action problems (Olson 1965, Frank 2010, He et al. 2014); however, this pattern contradicts the 
common pattern in cooperative groups, where the dominants contribute the least to the public 
good (Keller & Reeve 1994).   
 If collective behaviors are sensitive to the group’s mean cooperative effort in the first 
place, the degree of sensitivity will likely depend on the mechanistic details of the particular 
collective behavior. The nature of this dependency can be represented more abstractly as a 
benefit function, which depicts the rate at which total group cooperative effort is converted into 
group payoff (Fig 3.1; West et al. 2015, Gavrilets 2015). A collective behavior that become less 
effective in direct proportion to the loss of cooperative effort would have a linear shape (Fig 3.1 
– dotted line). In contrast, a collective behavior that is only achieved after some threshold of 
cooperative effort would have a nonlinear shape (Fig 3.1 – blue and orange lines). This occurs 
when the cooperative investments of the group members combine synergistically to produce the 
collective behavior, and its associated payoff to the group. These relationships have been 
described by Maynard-Smith & Szathmary (1995) using the metaphor of rowing versus sculling. 
In rowing, two passengers in a boat can each paddle on only one side at a time and can only 
move forward if both passengers paddle, so their interactions are synergistic. Using this 
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metaphor, rowing produces a nonlinear benefit function with respect to cooperative effort. In 
sculling, each passenger has a pair of paddles, so the boat will move forward even if only one 
passenger paddles, although they will move slower than if both paddled; this is characteristic of a 
linear relationship. The shape of a nonlinear benefit function will further dictate the impact of 
variation in a group’s cooperative effort. To extend this paddling metaphor further, if ten 
passengers find themselves in a very large boat, then all of them will need to paddle to make the 
boat go forward. In this imaginary scenario, if one passenger refrains from paddling, then the 
boat will be immovable, as is represented in the orange, concave-up curve in Fig 3.1. On the 
other hand, if ten passengers are in a very small boat, and one passenger refrains from paddling, 
the boat will continue to move forward at about the same speed. Only after seven of the 
passengers stop rowing will the boat begin to slow, as is represented by the blue, concave-down 
curve in Fig 3.1. This means that collective behaviors are expected to vary in what level of 
cooperative effort they require (the size of their boat) and how threshold-like those requirements 
are, since collective behaviors can span the range between the extreme cases illustrated here. The 
implications of these dependencies are that changes in cooperative effort will not have identical 
effects on all collective behaviors, but will depend on how the cooperative efforts of group 
members combine to produce a collective behavior. Despite the implications for these different 
payoff structures for the evolution of collective behaviors, we are lacking empirical evidence that 
explicitly shows how the benefits from collective behavior are realized in relation to the overall 
cooperative effort of the group (but see Michod 2007).  
 To test the hypothesis that collective raiding behavior depends on levels of cooperative 
investment by group members, I investigated collective raiding behavior in the slave-making ant, 
Temnothorax americanus. Slave-making ant colonies attack the nests of their hosts in 
65 
 
coordinated group raids, during which they gain possession of the host’s brood to populate their 
slave workforce (Buschinger 2009). Slave raiding is a collective behavior that can be broken 
down into the cooperative efforts of individual and easily measured for its payoff to the group as 
number of brood stolen. Slave-making ants are known to have naturally high levels of worker 
reproduction (Blatrix & Herbers 2004, Foitzik & Herbers 2001), which means some individuals 
use group resources for selfish gain (i.e. direct reproduction of males) while reducing their 
cooperative effort. Prior work on these ants and other slave-making ants with similar life-
histories has shown that reproductive workers are weak cooperators; they leave the nest to search 
for hosts less often (Pohl et al 2011, Blatrix & Herbers 2004) and partake in fewer raid-related 
activities, including following scouts and fighting (Bourke 1988), however, their effect on 
coordinated behaviors and colony-level outcomes are untested.  
 I manipulated levels of cooperation by activating worker ovaries, but measure 
cooperative investment by characterizing each worker’s costly participation in raids. First, I 
measured the impact of cooperative investment on the expression of collective behavior, i.e. at a 
mechanistic level (Birch 2012). Then, I described how the benefits of raiding change in relation 
to a colony’s total cooperative effort in raiding activities by mapping the shape of the benefit 
function for raiding. In addition to the global view provided by the benefit function, I 
characterized how selfish behavior manifested during raids. To do so, I described the function of 
different sub-tasks during raiding in an attempt to link individual behaviors to the benefit 
function. I then measured the effects of cooperation on these sub-tasks, thereby relating 
individual behaviors to the group’s behavior.  
 
Methods 
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Colony Collection & Maintenance 
 Colonies of T. americanus and their host species, T. longispinosus, were collected at the 
Huyck Preserve (42° 30' 53.7876", -74° 8' 27.7836"), Cornell Plantations Land (42° 27' 
55.2738", -76° 26' 34.299") and Bear Mountain State Park (41° 18' 33.9768", -74° 0' 14.6808") 
between May and July, 2014 – 2016. Colonies were transported back to Liddell Labs in Ithaca, 
NY in Ziploc bags and stored in a refrigerator (4C) for up to three weeks before being censused. 
Following census, each colony was placed inside a nest box containing an artificial nest. 
Artificial nests consisted of a balsa wood or plexiglass U-shape structure placed in between 2 
microscope slides held together with masking tape. Nest were then wrapped in foil to exclude 
light and housed in a plastic Ziploc box (10 x 10 cm) with a plaster floor, which was moistened 
twice per week to maintain humidity levels. Colonies were fed a teaspoon of Bhatkar diet twice 
per week and housed in a temperature controlled room at 26 C, with a 14L:10D daylight cycle. 
Raid Set-up 
 In all trials, the temperature was elevated to 30C the morning of the raid, and a plastic 
dish of food and moistened cotton were placed at the center of each glass arena to prevent 
dehydration or starvation during the trials. The upper rims of the 13 cm high walls were painted 
with Vaseline to prevent ants from escaping. If by 4pm, there were no slave-makers recruiting to 
or attacking the target nest, both colonies were removed from the glass arena and returned to 
their boxes until the next day. The colonies were given a maximum of five days to initiate a raid 
before the trial was aborted. If there was evidence of recruitment or a raid (i.e. the target nest had 
vacated, there was a raiding party in the arena, or slave-makers were entering or exiting the 
target nest), I left both colonies in the arena overnight and collected them the next morning, so 
that colonies stayed in the arena for 24 (±4) hours. The raiding room was set to the same lighting 
67 
 
regime as the room housing colonies, and I lowered the temperature back to 26C to coincide with 
darkness.  
Cooperation Experiment 
 To test the effect of cooperation on the collective raiding behavior of T. americanus, I 
artificially boosted the level of selfish investment in reproduction in experimental colonies. I 
then compared their performance during raids to that of control colonies. To elevate the level of 
selfish reproductive investment, I performed a temporary sociotomy, i.e. split the colony into two 
equal parts, to give middle-ranking slave-maker workers the opportunity to ascend the 
dominance hierarchy. Previous work in other ant species has shown that middle and high ranking 
individuals ascend the dominance hierarchy when the queen or most dominant worker was 
removed, and that their reproductive systems respond in kind to these social changes through 
enhanced ovary development (Ito & Higashi 1991; Heinze & Smith 1990). For the purposes of 
keeping splits even, queens were counted towards slave-maker workers.  I then allowed the two 
colony fractions to exist separately for 3 weeks. Three weeks was a conservative estimate of how 
long it would take subordinate workers to develop their ovaries, as this effect took 5-6 days in 
another slave-making ant with similar life history (Harpagoxenus sublaevis, Bourke 1988), and 2 
weeks in Diacamma ants (Peeters & Tsuji 1993).  
 I confirmed that the treatment had the intended effect of elevating worker reproduction 
by dissecting each worker’s abdomen under a dissecting microscope. For each worker, I 
measured the length of each ovariole using a micrometer eyepiece at 20x magnification and 
summed the length of each ovariole to assign each worker an ovarian development score. I then 
computed a mean ovarian development score for the colony by summing each score and then 
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dividing by the number of workers in that colony. Using this metric, I compared mean ovarian 
development between treatment and control colonies using a Mann-Whitney U test. 
 After the separation period, I marked each slave-maker on the abdomen, thorax and head 
with RC Car Pactra Paint, and let each dry in a vial for at least four hours. I then re-untied the 
two halves of the colony into a single nest with a fraction of their host workers to standardize the 
host-to-slave-maker ratio at 1:1 and removed any brood. The ants were allowed to move in to an 
observation nest (same as described below for hosts) and left them overnight. On the following 
morning, I observed colonies in a dissecting microscope in three 10 minute sessions to record 
dominance interactions, which included: antennal boxing, food solicitation, biting, or standing on 
top of another ant. 
 One to three days before a raid, host nests were prepared by randomly selecting 25 
workers and 25 brood items (a mixture of larvae and pupae) from an existing T. longispinosus 
lab colony. When source colonies contained insufficient brood, I added brood from other lab 
colonies, but always from colonies collected from the same population, and they were readily 
accepted. The workers were then allowed to move in to an observation nest of standard size, 
consisting of 2.5 mm thick balsa wood with a 22 mm diameter circle and 1 mm entry way placed 
between two 5 cm x 7.5 cm microscope slides. A piece of clear red plastic filter was taped to the 
top microscope slide to make it appear dark to the ants but visible to the researcher. 
 Raiding trials took place in containers consisting of 2 glass rectangular boxes (45 cm x 25 
cm) connected by a paper bridge measuring 10 cm in length and bottom of the glass arenas were 
lined with white construction paper. On one end of the arena, I placed the slave-maker colony 
and on the other side, the host colony, such that they were 1 meter apart. Raids were filmed using 
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a webcam (Logitech C920 HD Pro), with cameras positioned above each nest so that behaviors 
inside the nests were observable. 
 On the day following a raid, I opened each nest and counted the contents of each to 
determine the number of brood the slave-maker colony had stolen. I then placed all slave-maker 
workers in a freezer (-18ºC) for later dissection. I watched the recordings of each nest to 
determine if recruitment had occurred in the slave-maker nest following host nest discovery, and 
if so, the size of the raiding party that arrived at the host nest prior to attack.   
 To test the effect of worker reproduction on raiding strategies, I compared control and 
treatment colonies in (1) their frequency to initiate attacks alone versus as a group. I used a one-
tailed Fisher’s Exact test in both comparisons.  To measure the effect of worker reproduction on 
raiding performance, I compared the number of brood stolen between control and treatment trials 
using a Mann-Whitney U test with the “wilcox.exact” function in the exactRankTests R package.  
Benefit Function for Raiding  
 To characterize the benefit function for raiding, I compared number of brood stolen with 
the size of the raiding party that arrived at the host nest. I included additional data from raids 
conducted for other purposes, but for which methods were similar. These additional raids were 
conducted in smaller arenas (25 cm x 45 cm) without paper-lined floors. In 7 of these additional 
trials, slave-makers were offered a single host nest containing 20 workers and 20 brood, housed 
in Plexiglas observation nests. In 9 of these additional trials, slave-makers were offered two host 
nests consisting of acorns or hickory nuts, one containing 25 workers and 25 brood, the other 
containing 50 workers. For these trials, I only selected cases where the slave-makers found the 
25 worker nest only. The host nests in the all of the trials used for this analysis contained a 1:1 
ratio of workers and brood, and were very similar in their absolute sizes (25 or 20), a difference 
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that is unlikely to make a large difference in slave-maker success (Miller, Chapter 1). All trials 
followed the same pre- and post-raid procedures with the exception of the details described 
above.  
 I first compared the raiding success between solo attack strategy (raiding party = 1) and 
the group raiding strategy (raiding party > 1) using a Mann-Whitney U test. To generate the 
benefit function, I then characterized the relationship between raiding party size and the 
proportion of brood stolen with a variety of regression models and selected the one with the best 
fit. I ran the following regressions using the “glm”, “glm.nb” and “nls” functions in the lme4 and 
stats R packages : (1) linear model with a binomial distribution and two-vector response variable, 
(2) Linear model with a negative binomial distribution, (3) linear model with logit transformed 
response variable, and (4) non-linear model using Michaelis-Menten equation.  I compared the 
goodness of fit between models using mean squared error (MSE), the correlation between the 
predicted and actual data and AICc values.  
 To more robustly measure the effect of raiding strategy (solo vs group) on group payoff, I 
compared the outcomes of solo raids to group raids in terms of brood stolen and mortality rates 
using the same larger dataset as described above. I compared the mean proportion of brood 
stolen and the mean mortality rate between strategies using a t-test. 
Mechanisms of Raiding 
 To characterize the behavioral mechanisms slave-makers use during attack, I observed 
videos of host nests from the cooperation experiment. I focused on the behavior of slave-maker 
workers from the time a slave-maker worker initiated a raid by entering the host nest until the 
host nest was evacuated of all host workers, not including brood. I used GriffinVC (Singh & 
Ragir 2015), an ethogram data collection tool, to code behavioral events and assign time-stamps. 
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There were two stereotyped behaviors, ‘herding’ and ‘door guarding’, on which I focused my 
measurements. In addition, I recorded the time at which each brood item and/or host worker 
exited the nest during the raid. Using these data, I calculated the proportion of the raid that 
herding or door guarding occurred, and for when they occurred simultaneously.  
 To determine how raiding success is affected by these raiding-specific tasks, I 
constructed a linear model of the number of brood stolen as a function of the following factors: 
proportion of time spent guarding the door, proportion of time spent herding, raiding party size 
and all possible interactions. Using the “dredge” function in the MuMin R package, I selected the 
top models with a delta AICc <7. There was more than one model that met this criteria, so I 
averaged the top models using the “model.avg” function (Table 3.1).  
 To test the hypothesis that door guarding functions to keep brood from being carried 
away by host workers, I compared the rate of brood exiting the nest during door guard presence 
to absence. The data were non-normal, so I used a Mann-Whitney U test in all the comparisons 
described in here. To test the hypothesis that herding accelerates evacuation, I compared the rate 
at which host workers exit during herding to when there was no herding. To determine whether 
the level of cooperation in a colony affects these raiding-specific behaviors, I compared the 
following metrics between control and treatment colonies: the effectiveness of door guarding 
(i.e. rate of brood exit) and the proportion of time that herding and door guarding co-occur.  
 
Results 
Cooperation Experiment 
 I conducted 17 successful trials (8 treatment, 9 controls) with 14 different slave-maker 
colonies, such that three colonies were tested in both the control and treatment conditions. The 
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mean ovarian development score for treatment colonies (23.9 ± 15.8 µm) tended to be higher 
than control colonies (8.4 ± 4.5 µm) for control colonies, however this difference was not 
statistically significant (p = 0.146, W = 12).  
 Treatment colonies differed in their raiding strategies relative to control colonies (Fig 3.2; 
p<0.001, odds ratio = inf.). In general, even if a scout initiated an attack alone, it might still 
return home to recruit a raiding party but the host colony would already have begun evacuation. 
In all of the treatment trials, the slave-maker scout that discovered the host nest initiated the 
attack alone (solo attack strategy), without the aid of other slave-maker workers. In contrast to 
this solo strategy, control colonies initiated the attack as a group in eight out of the nine trials, 
such that the scout return home to recruit a raiding party before entering the host nest. In only 
two of the treatment trials did the scout return home after initiating attack; in one case there were 
no other slave-maker workers at home to recruit and in the other case, slave-maker workers were 
present, but the slave-maker did not perform the behavioral excitement characteristic of 
recruitment and elicited no followers.  In the one case of solo attack in the control trials, the 
slave-maker scout returned home and performed the regular recruitment behaviors, eliciting a 
raiding party to follow. Despite the fact that treatment colonies differed in their attack strategy, 
they did not steal significantly less brood than control colonies (Fig. 3.2; p = 0.248, W = 
28.5, ?̅?control = 11.22, ?̅?treat = 8.25), although treatment colonies tended to steal fewer brood. 
Benefit Function for Raiding 
 Results from raids in the larger data-set show that the group raiding typically leads to 
higher rates of brood acquisition than the solo attack strategy (p = 0.039, W = 86, ?̅?solo = 0.356, 
?̅?group = 0.525). The benefit function describing how gains in brood increase with participation 
level, i.e. the size of the raiding party, was best approximated by a concave down function. The 
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model of best fit was the non-linear regression using the Michaelis-Menten function 
y=(α*x)/(β+x), which had had the smallest mean squared error and AICc values, and the highest 
correlation between predicted and actual data (Fig 3.3, Table 3.2). The parameter estimates for 
the non-linear model are α = 0.634 (± 0.160; p<0.001) and β = 0.715 (±0.602; p=0.244).  
 In general, raids initiated as a group stole a higher proportion of brood than raids that 
initiated raids using a solo attack strategy (Fig 3.4A; p = 0.011, df = 30.2, t = -2.39, ?̅?solo = 
0.34, ?̅?group = 0.56 ). Similarly, raids that initiated raids using a group suffered lower mortality 
than raids initiated using a solo strategy (Fig 3.4B; p = 0.021, df = 30.6, t = 2.13, ?̅?solo = 
0.17, ?̅?group = 0.05). 
Mechanisms of Raiding 
 When a raid was initiated, at least one slave-maker worker entered the host nest and 
rapidly moved around the interior. During this rapid movement, which I term ‘herding’, a slave-
maker worker approached groups of host workers, which promptly fled from the slave-maker. 
Host workers occasionally oriented towards an attacking slave-maker, but the slave-maker 
prodded these hosts with her head or mandibles, leading the host workers to retreat. The slave-
makers do not appear to be moving to evade host worker aggression, but rather they move 
towards host workers, even re-orienting towards other clusters of workers when the targeted 
cluster had moved out of physical contact. In addition to ‘herding’, a slave-maker worker also 
stood at the nest entrance during the raiding process, a behavior I term ‘door guarding.’ This 
slave-maker was usually positioned inside the nest, with her head facing towards the exterior. 
The door guard appears to permit empty-handed host workers exit the nest, but she bites and 
chases brood-carrying workers, preventing their exit. Slave-maker workers do not begin to carry 
brood back to their home nest until all of the resident host workers have vacated. The attack, 
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including the events described above but not including brood transport, last a mean 8.23 (± 1.78) 
minutes. Herding takes place during 64.5 (± 0.07) % of the attack and at least one door guard is 
present during 34.7 (± 0.06) % of the time, however a door guard often stays in position after all 
the host workers have evacuated. The raiding party that initiated an attack was on average 2.4 (± 
0.2) slave-maker workers, but was as few as one and as many as 8.    
 The results of model selection and model averaging show that the most important 
predictor of the number of brood stolen was the proportion of time spent guarding the door 
(Table 3.1; p = 0.011, relative importance = 1.00, β = 0.784). The size of the raiding party was 
the next most important predictor (p=0.375, relative importance =0.27, β = 0.385), followed by 
the strongly negative effect of herding time (p=0.799, relative importance =0.12, β = -0.983). 
The extent of overlap between these two tasks was a significant positive predictor of brood 
stolen (p = 0.022, F1,13 = 6.803). 
 The hypothesis that door guarding prevents host evacuation of brood was supported. 
When the door was being guarded, fewer brood escaped than when no door guard was present 
(Fig. 3.5A; p < 0.001, W = 36, ?̅?present = 0.010, ?̅?absent = 0.038). The level of cooperation in a 
colony had no significant effect on slave-maker’s tendency to guard the nest entrance during a 
raid (p = 0.661, W = 29, ?̅?control = 0.32, ?̅?treat = 0.395) nor did it affect their effectiveness at 
keeping brood inside (p = 0.697, W = 23.5, ?̅?control = 0.006, ?̅?treat = 0.016).  
 The hypothesis that herding accelerates host evacuation was supported, as host workers 
exit at a greater rate during herding (Fig. 3.5B, p < 0.001, W = 51.5, ?̅?herd = 0.071, ?̅?no.herd = 
0.026). The level of cooperation had a slight, non-significant effect on the amount of time 
herding and door guarding occurred simultaneously (p = 0.058, W = 47.5, ?̅?control = 0.232, ?̅?treat = 
0.019), with greater task overlap in control trials. 
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Discussion 
 Cooperation levels had a measurable and significant impact on the expression of 
collective behavior. Colonies with elevated levels of selfishness adopted different raiding 
strategies than control colonies. Instead of recruiting colony-mates and raiding as a collective, 
scout ants from selfish colonies abstained from recruitment and attacked alone. Despite these 
behavioral differences, colonies with elevated selfishness did not perform significantly worse 
than control colonies, although there was a tendency to steal fewer brood (Fig 3.2). Solo attacks 
generally result in fewer stolen brood, as shown by data from a larger sample of raiding trials, so 
it is noteworthy that conflict colonies employing this strategy did not suffer the same penalty. 
The reason for the lack of disparity between treatments is unclear, but it suggests that workers 
from selfish colonies behaviorally compensated for their handicap of raiding alone, or 
alternatively, that there was not adequate power to detect a difference. 
 The benefit function of raiding behavior follows a concave down shape (Fig 3.3), 
corresponding to low sensitivity to selfishness (Fig 3.1). The additional benefits to raiding parties 
greater than two were marginal, with the largest increase between raiding parties from one (solo 
attack) to two.  Even though there were apparent benefits of attacking as a raiding party, the 
benefits of the collective strategy are not as large as expected. Since the act of raiding does not 
always require a group, the success of the colony may be less dependent on group performance 
during raids, thereby relaxing selection on this collective behavior. 
 The descriptive measures of raiding presented here illustrate that slave-makers can be 
relatively effective as solo attackers. This is particularly true if they spend ample time guarding 
the door rather than herding, and thus prevent much of the brood from leaving with escaping host 
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workers (Fig 3.4A). Having an additional slave-maker to assist during the attack offered an 
advantage when one ant herds while the other guards the door. These two tasks appear to act in 
synergy, and lead to greater quantities of stolen brood when done simultaneously rather than 
sequentially, and this was the case for control colonies.  
 While herding behavior accelerates host evacuation, it also accelerates evacuation of 
brood, unless there is a door guard. Thus, the benefits of raiding as a pair are achieved only when 
two workers coordinate by adopting complementary actions, and may help explain why there are 
diminishing returns after raiding parties reach a size of two workers. Additional slave-makers 
beyond the two may help with either herding or door guarding, although redundancy in these 
tasks was not essential for success. However, having back-up may help ensure at least one slave-
maker is in position if there is more than one nest entrance or when slave-makers are 
immobilized by the defending host workers (Jongepier et al. 2014).  
 The observations here shows that cooperation creates conditions for task coordination to 
take place, but does not guarantee that it will. Whether selfishness affects the skill with which 
individuals perform their specific tasks or the degree of coordination could not be analyzed 
because selfishness led only to solo attacks. Further investigation into the mechanics of raiding is 
needed to determine what facilitates coordination and which cues are used to initiate these tasks 
in real-time. Another important behavior during slave-raids is the release of propaganda 
pheromone (Brandt et al 2006), but it was unclear from lab observations when or by whom such 
compounds were emitted, so specific tasks could not be linked to pheromone release behaviors. 
It is clear, however, that workers from high conflict colonies are less likely to return home to 
recruit nest-mates. This implies that workers are keeping track of the cooperation levels in the 
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rest of the colony, but there may be other social mechanisms at play that alter a slave-maker’s 
threshold to recruit. 
 The resiliency of T. americanus raiding behavior to low levels of cooperation implies that 
worker selfishness may reach relatively high levels before incurring significant fitness costs. 
Elevated worker reproduction is well documented in other slave-making ants (Heinze 1996, 
Herbers & Stuart 1998) and has been attributed to conflict over sex-ratios (reviewed in Bourke 
1989), however the results here suggest an alternative explanation. Worker reproduction may 
incur minor costs to the group when raiding does not necessitate a large fraction of the colony in 
order to be successful. It is unclear if raiding behavior is equally resilient to worker selfishness in 
other species, and it would be interesting to see if their benefit function for raiding matches the 
concave down shape found here.  
 The association between worker reproduction and the benefit function found here simply 
establishes an interdependency between the two, but does not distinguish an order of 
evolutionary causality. In other words, it remains unclear whether elevated worker reproduction 
in slave-making ants is an evolutionary response to the low cooperative efforts required of 
raiding, or instead whether the shape of the benefit function is an adaptation to high rates of 
worker reproduction permitted by the slave-maker lifestyle. Nevertheless, these experiments do 
suggest that cooperation has the potential to impact the expression of a collective behavior, and 
vice versa. As long as selfishness disrupts the benefits gained through collective behavior, then 
selection ought to favor groups that are more cooperative (Gardner 2015).  
 The findings here raise further questions about what relationships we should expect 
between cooperation and collective behavior in other social insects and other cooperative groups. 
Collective behaviors that require more components or larger numbers ought to be more sensitive 
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to lapses in cooperation, assuming that selfishness leads to non-involvement as it did here. This 
suggests that more complex collective behaviors may only be stable in groups that are already 
highly cooperative. On the other hand, collective behaviors may still evolve in groups where 
conflict is common, but the benefit functions are likely to differ and instead exhibit lower 
sensitivity (e.g. linear or concave down). Future empirical and theoretical investigations of 
collective behavior and within-group heterogeneity should consider cooperation for both its 
mechanistic and ultimate level consequences.  
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Figure 3.1: Hypothetical benefit functions depict the relationship between cooperative 
investments by the group and the payoff dispensed to the group. Here, the benefit functions for 
three different hypothetical collective behaviors are drawn to illustrate the implications of curve 
shape. A collective behavior’s benefit function will dictate how sensitive or resilient it is to 
cooperation. Different hypotheses for how cooperation levels will impact collective behavior are 
depicted with different colors. Collective behaviors with (blue) concave down benefit function 
are expected to have low sensitivity to loss of cooperation, and exhibit minimal loss of function. 
Collective behaviors with (orange) concave up benefit functions are expected to have high 
sensitivity to loss of cooperation, and exhibit large loss of function. The linear dotted line depicts 
an intermediate level of sensitivity, in which loss of cooperation corresponds directly to loss of 
function. 
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Figure 3.2: Selfish and control colonies acquire a similar quantity of brood from raids at host 
nests containing 25 workers and 25 brood. Although control colonies gain slightly more brood, 
this trend is not statistically significant (p = 0.248). Control colonies are much more likely to raid 
as a group (green data points) than selfish colonies, which exclusively adopted a solitary raiding 
strategy (orange data points; p < 0.001).  
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Figure 3.3: The benefit function for collective raiding is depicted as a function of participation 
level, or raiding party size. The data were fit to a non-linear regression and the curve and 95% 
confidence intervals are plotted [y=0.634*x/(0.715+x)]. 
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Figure 3.4: The payoffs of solo versus group raiding strategies in terms of the (A) benefits, as 
the mean proportion of brood stolen (p = 0.011) and (B) the costs, as mean mortality rate (p = 
0.023), measured as the proportion of the colony’s slave-maker workers that died. All raids 
conducted at host colonies containing 20 or 25 workers and brood, where brood and worker 
number were matched. 
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Figure 3.5: The function of sub-tasks that occur during raiding are summarized in these two 
plots. (A) The presence of a door guard effectively prevents brood from leaving the attacked nest 
(p < 0.001) and (B) the activity of herding within the nest interior accelerates host evacuation (p 
< 0.001). 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: What takes place during raids that determine success or failure? (A) Results of model 
selection (ΔAICc<7). (B) Results of model averaging. Predictor abbreviations: Herd = 
Proportion of time spent herding; Door = Proportion of time spent guarding door; RP = Number 
of slave-makers in raiding party. 
 
(A) Global Model: Number brood stolen ~ Herd * Door * RP 
 
Candidate Models   df logLik AICc Delta 
(ΔAICc) 
Weight 
Door  3 -47.81 103.8 0.00 0.613 
Door + RP  4 -47.25 106.5 2.70 0.159 
Door + Herd  4 -47.78 107.6 3.76 0.093 
Door + RP + Door* RP   5 -45.60 107.87 4.07 0.08 
Door + RP + Herd  5 -46.98 110.63 6.84 0.02 
 
(B) Model-Averaged Results 
 
Parameters  Estimate SE Z P-value Importance 
Door       0.784 0.290 2.534 0.011 1.00 
RP             0.385 0.409 0.887 0.375 0.27 
Herd      -0.059 0.209 0.255 0.799 0.12 
Door*RP   -0.983 0.598 1.464 0.143 0.08 
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Table 3.2: Different regression models for the benefit function are listed along with different 
measures of goodness-of-fit. AICc refers to the information criteria of the model; Correlation 
refers to the correlation between the predicted and actual data, and MSE is the mean squared 
error. The models analyzed raiding party size as a predictor of the proportion of brood stolen. 
Model  AICc Correlation MSE 
Non-Linear (Michaelis-Menten)  12.8 0.2891 0.0721 
Linear: logit transformed   128.6 0.2257 2.4040 
Linear: binomial distribution  
(success, failures) 
 396.5 0.2255 8.9357 
Linear: negative binomial distribution  52.8 0.7162 0.7162 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIORS ON THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION: 
WHEN EMERGENT PROPERTIES PROVIDE NONLINEAR BENEFITS 
Abstract 
 
I construct a nonlinear public goods game to investigate the effects of collective behaviors on the 
evolution of cooperation. I argue that sigmoidal benefit functions capture the payoffs from many 
self-organized collective behaviors and I borrow a model from biochemistry, the Hill equation 
for cooperative binding, to approximate the way individual contributions can combine non-
additively. I develop a model in which cooperation and competition trade-off with one another in 
a tug-of-war structure. This structure differs from former models of public goods which assume 
separate costs that are independent of other group members’ actions. The model also 
incorporates variable group size and relatedness to investigate how these factors interact with the 
benefit function. The model predicts that sigmoidal benefits enhance cooperation, and that 
steeper increases promote cooperation. On the other hand, early inflections and diminishing 
returns reduce cooperation, particularly in groups with high relatedness. Interestingly, the boosts 
to cooperation provided by sigmoid benefit functions are predicted to become stronger as group 
size increases. The implications for the role of collective behaviors in the evolution of 
cooperation are as follows: (1) the influence of collective behaviors may be limited to groups 
that are already large. (2) Collective behaviors that are fitness enhancing will not necessarily 
increase cooperation, however they will if they are both fitness enhancing and arise in a non-
linear fashion. (3) On the other hand, collective behaviors that are fitness enhancing will reduce 
cooperation if they are both fitness enhancing and bring inflection points earlier. More empirical 
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work is needed to measure the parameters defining the shape of benefit functions of various 
collective behaviors to test the validity of these predictions.  
 
Introduction 
Theoretical models of public goods games predict that complete defection is inevitable, 
however cooperation is widespread in biological examples of shared public goods. This 
contradiction has been the focus of many behavioral ecologists, and has led to the discovery of 
several mechanisms that stabilize cooperation and minimize the tragedy of the commons, 
including policing (Frank 1995), relatedness or population structuring (Hamilton 1964), 
reciprocity (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981) and between-group competition (Reeve & Hölldobler 
2007). More recently, however, researchers are recognizing the power of non-linear returns or 
synergistic interactions to promote cooperation in public goods games (Archetti et al. 2011; and 
earlier, Queller 1985). Nonlinear benefits are probably as common as linear benefits and recent 
reviews have highlighted the possible importance of nonlinear returns to the stability of 
cooperation within and between species (Riehl & Frederickson 2016, Archetti et al 2011). 
The earliest attempts to treat nonlinear returns theoretically were intended to model 
specific cases of group hunting or attack (Packer & Ruttan 1988, Berryman et al. 1985, Aviles 
1999), however these efforts laid the ground-work for more general models of non-linear public 
goods games. Recently, there has been a surge in the analysis of multi-player public goods 
games with non-linear benefit functions (Peña et al. 2015, Van Cleve & Açkay 2014, Zhang et 
al. 2013; Archetti & Scheuring 2010). Despite differences in their approaches, they converge on 
the same basic prediction that nonlinear benefits can create a stable a mixture of cooperators and 
defectors. However, existing models have restrictive assumptions and more nuanced predictions 
about the dynamics of cooperation are still relatively unexplored. 
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Prior efforts to capture non-linear benefit functions consider cases of either uniquely 
diminishing returns, uniquely accelerating returns with no bounds (Frank 2010, Foster 2004, Van 
Cleve & Açkay 2014, Peña et al. 2015), or step-functions (Archetti 2009 JEB, Boza & Szamado 
2010), none of which are likely to represent most group behaviors. Step-functions are limited if 
one wishes to explore the continuous variation in curve steepness, and a combination of 
gradually accelerating and decelerating returns, i.e. a sigmoid, is probably closer to reality. There 
is evidence for sigmoid benefit functions across taxonomic groups and social contexts, including 
cooperative hunting in mammals (Packer et al. 1990, MacNulty et al 2011), cooperative nest 
defense in birds (Niemasik personal communication, Rabenold 1984), and in cooperative 
production of chemical compounds in yeast and bacteria (Gore et al. 2009, Greig and Travisano 
2004, Pearson et al. 1997). In turn, several authors have considered sigmoidal benefit functions 
in public goods games, confirming that sigmoidal benefit functions yield predictions that are 
distinct from the other benefit functions described above (Pacheco et al. 2009, Vásárhelyi & 
Scheuring 2013, Zhang et al. 2013, Chen et al. 2012, Cornforth et al. 2012). These prior attempts 
to model sigmoidal benefits, however, fail to incorporate other aspects or applications of the 
model presented here.  
In particular, I apply this modeling framework to the study of collective behavior. In 
addition to the cooperative behaviors mentioned above, public goods games with nonlinear 
returns may be especially relevant to collective or self-organized behaviors, where interactions 
result in emergent properties at the group-level (Couzin & Karuse 2003). For instance, 
researchers in statistical mechanics have noted that group-level behaviors undergo a ‘phase 
transition’ or are poised at a ‘point of criticality’, in which a group suddenly acquires a new 
property under the right conditions (Miramontes 1995, Bialek et al. 2012, Leonard 2014). Such 
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collective actions are distinct because they lead to unique phenotypes or benefits otherwise 
unattainable as individuals (Camazine et al. 2001, Sumpter 2010), thus providing a public good. 
While a phase transition is the idea of an emergent property arising suddenly, emergent 
properties could also arise more gradually, depicting a sigmoidal curve with a more gradual rise. 
These rates of change will depend on the specific nature and/or the frequency of 
interactions, which may be constrained or shaped by the ecology or physiology of a particular 
species, such that each collective behavior may produce its own benefit function. Aside from 
theory, nonlinear benefit functions have been identified in a handful of self-organized, collective 
behaviors so far, including the following examples. Foraging increases at a nonlinear rate in 
response to recruitment via chemical trails in the Pharaoh’s ant (Beekman et al. 2001).  
Collective cognition also improves at a nonlinear rate with group size when tested in 
Temnothorax ants over a discrimination task (Sasaki et al. 2013). The emergence of small world 
networks has also been found to arise in a nonlinear fashion with minor changes in connectivity 
(Watts & Strogatz 1998, Robson & Traniello 1999). In a swarm-founding wasp, the effectiveness 
of group defense increases nonlinearly as the number of participants increases (London & Jeanne 
2003). 
 Analogous threshold dynamics are well described and quantified in the literature on 
biochemistry, as researchers have aimed to describe the cooperative binding properties of various 
enzymes and drugs (Whitty 2008, Frank 2013). Cooperative binding is often described using the 
example of oxygen binding hemoglobin. Once one oxygen molecule binds one of the four 
binding-sites, the affinity of the other binding sites increases, a result known as cooperativity. 
When the binding rate is plotted against the total concentration of oxygen, the result is a 
sigmoidal curve, in which binding is at first slow, but the rate of binding increases in a non-linear 
93 
 
fashion as binding affinity rises. Eventually, the binding rate slows again as un-bound sites 
become less abundant. The equation developed to describe this process is called the Hill equation 
(Hill 1910), and sometimes referred to as the dose-dependent curve (De Lean et al. 1978).  
 The binding characteristics of chemicals and the behavioral interactions in collective 
behaviors are obviously quite different in a literal sense, however the dose-dependent quality of 
each makes for an apt analogy to collective behaviors. As the ‘dose’ of a relevant behavior (i.e. 
the cooperative investment) increases, there is a non-linear increase in the pay-off for performing 
those behaviors.  In order to carry this analogy mathematically, I adopt the Hill equation to 
approximate collective behaviors that require cooperation.  
 Framing collective behaviors as a public goods game in this way will progress our 
understanding of how and when collective behaviors evolve. Intrinsic group factors, such as 
individual phenotypes, average cooperation or group size, are all expected to play important 
roles in the evolution of collective behaviors (Marnard-Smith & Szathmary 1995, Dornhaus et al. 
2012, Modlmeier et al 2012, Pinter-Wollman et al. 2011), however that is not to discount the 
importance of extrinsic factors, like ecology, as well (Gordon 2014). The multi-player nonlinear 
public goods game provides one of the first theoretical frameworks to explore the connection 
between a group’s cooperative investment and its collective behaviors.  
 There are a couple reasons to suspect that cooperation may be especially relevant to the 
evolution of collective behaviors. First, many classes of collective behaviors require efforts by 
group members that do not immediately lead to benefits for the actor. Group behaviors are often, 
but not always, cooperative endeavors that require an upfront investment, but yield some benefit 
to the group. Second, cooperation can facilitate selection for group-level traits, like collective 
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behaviors, that enhance a group’s competitive ability (Maynard-Smith & Szathmary 1995, 
Bourke 2011, Corning & Szathmary 2015).  
 To clarify the assumptions and applications of this model, it is important to emphasize 
that this model only applies to cases where participating in a collective behavior brings about an 
immediate, direct cost to the actor, and thereby represents an altruistic act. For instance, this 
model does not accurately represent a flock of birds, in which coordinating movement with the 
group results in a simultaneous immediate benefit to the actor and a coincident benefit to the rest 
of the flock, as there is no social dilemma. Likewise, the nonlinear benefit curves should be 
distinguished from allee effects. An allee effect often refers to the beneficial but passive by-
product of conspecific presence, as in positive frequency dependence (Stephens et al. 1999). The 
behavioral interactions required for the class of collective behaviors to which this model applies 
require both active and initially costly behavioral responses from conspecifics. It is also 
important to note that the analysis here does not make any assumptions about the absolute 
payoffs of any given benefit function. Linear functions and sigmoid functions are assumed to 
produce the same payoffs at complete cooperation. 
 Here, I incorporate cooperation and competition into my model by breaking with two of 
the standard assumptions of a public goods game in which (1) there are individual costs to 
cooperating, and (2) benefits are shared by all group members equally. Instead, I allow for 
continuous degrees of cooperation, allowing players to adopt variable cost burdens. In addition, 
each player receives a different quantity of the group resource based on their competitive 
investment relative to the efforts of others, so that players are in a tug-of-war over the group’s 
resources. Each individual must therefore make an allocation decision between cooperation and 
competition. Such a trade-off is likely to characterize many cooperative behaviors, and be 
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especially true of collective behaviors which require an individual be present or involved in a 
place or activity that precludes acting in self-interested ways. Thus, the costs are not explicitly 
set at any given value or even allowed to vary according to some coefficient. Instead, the costs 
are simply a degradation in the ability of the focal individual to acquire those group-level 
resources for oneself. 
 Finally, this model incorporates group size and within-group relatedness to facilitate 
more biologically relevant predictions. While other models analyze the effects of relatedness 
(Van Cleve & Açkay 2014, Zhang et al. 2013) or population viscosity (Peña et al. 2015, 
Vásárhelyi & Scheuring, 2013) on cooperation, their conclusions are limited because their 
analyses were specialized to extract the unique effects of each. My aim here is not to repeat these 
analyses, but rather examine how relatedness interacts with other model parameters in non-
intuitive ways, and the same is true of group size. Here, I assume that groups of any size can 
produce benefit functions of any shape, however it is plausible that group size imposes 
constraints or has independent effects on the shape of the benefit function (Dornhaus et al 2012). 
 Here, I present a more generalized version of the nonlinear public goods game for the 
purposes of analyzing the effects of collective behaviors on the evolution of cooperation. I argue 
that sigmoidal benefit functions are an approximation that captures the generality of many self-
organized collective behaviors and I borrow a model from biochemistry to approximate the way 
individual contributions can combine in a synergistic or non-additive manner. This form of the 
model allows investigation of how and to what extent collective behaviors can drive cooperation. 
To address this, I incorporate the following parameters into a model: (1) collective behavior 
traits, encompassing the rate at which the behavior and its associated benefits emerge; (2) 
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cooperation and competition between group-members; and (3) other group traits, including group 
size and within-group relatedness.  
 I show that a sigmoid benefit function can elevate cooperation beyond linear benefits, but 
not universally. The steepness of sigmoid curve promotes cooperation, with steeper increases 
predicting higher rates of cooperation, and such boosts to cooperation become stronger with 
increasing group size. Although models of public goods games are more often focused on 
identifying mechanisms that promote cooperation, nonlinear benefits reduce cooperation relative 
to additive benefits due to the diminishing returns part of the sigmoid. 
 
The model 
This model describes a group of “n” symmetrical individuals that produce a shared group 
resource, G.  Each group member extracts a fraction, F, of that shared resource, so an 
individual’s direct fitness is simply determined by their personal share of the group resource. 
Therefore, direct fitness is depicted as the size of the group resource multiplied by the selfish 
fraction (a percentage): 
𝑊 = 𝐹 ∗ 𝐺                      (Eqn 1) 
 
I will now walk through how the selfish fraction, F, and the group resource, G, are built. I 
will consider two different benefit functions for G, and compare the outcomes for each. 
Each individual has an identical starting energy budget of 1, which they can devote to 
either cooperative or selfish efforts. Individuals can vary the degree to which they allocate their 
energy budget to the two options, but face a trade-off between the two. Cooperative efforts, x, 
contribute to the group’s total resources, G. Selfish efforts, or 1-x, are used to consume/extract 
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the group’s resources. This structure assumes that each group member has the same ability to 
extract from or produce the group resource, but that individuals can vary in how much they 
chose to invest in each.  
I analyze the model for stable rate of cooperation that results in the optimal fitness benefit 
at the individual level. In order to evolve, the decision to cooperate is assumed to be under 
genetic control. I include a parameter for relatedness, r, between group-members, such that cases 
where groups consist of kin can be considered. If there are kin in a group, they will adopt the 
same strategy with probability ‘r’, i.e. the value of relatedness. 
The structure of this model uses the neighbor-modulated fitness, which is the original 
Hamiltonian formulation of kin selection (Hamilton 1964). Neighbor modulated fitness accounts 
for the effects that related group members dispense onto the focal individual. Thus, W (Eqn 1) is 
the direct fitness of a mutant, not its inclusive fitness. Unlike the simplified version of inclusive 
fitness, neighbor-modulated fitness makes no assumptions about the costs and benefits being 
additive, rendering this form especially appropriate for an analysis of non-linear benefits to 
cooperation. 
This model follows a tug-of-war structure, where the total size of individual’s fraction of 
the group resource will depend on both its own selfish effort (1-x) and the selfish efforts of all 
other group members. To represent this relationship, an individual’s selfish effort is divided by 
the sum of the selfish efforts of n other group members. A rare mutant who adopts the selfish 
strategy (1-x) in a population playing the population strategy (1-x*) will have the following 
selfish fraction, F: 
𝐹 =
1−𝑥
(1−𝑥) + 𝑟 (𝑛 − 1)(1−𝑥) + (1 − 𝑟)(𝑛 − 1)(1−𝑥∗)
                           (Eqn 2) 
 
98 
 
The denominator in Eqn 2 consists of the sum of the mutant’s selfish effort (1-x), the 
selfish efforts of those playing the same mutant strategy and the selfish efforts of those playing 
the population strategy (1-x*). The number of individuals playing the same mutant strategy is 
determined by r (n - 1), or the number of group members that share the allele for the mutant 
strategy. Relatedness, r, is the probability that two group members share the allele for the mutant 
strategy, whereas individuals lacking the mutant allele will play the population strategy (1-x*), 
and (1-r)(n-1) is the number of individuals playing that strategy.  
Increases in selfish efforts come at the expense of the group’s cooperative efforts, thereby 
diminishing the total group resource available to everyone. In this public goods game, there is no 
direct cost to acting cooperatively, as there are in standard public goods games (Frank 2010); 
only a coincident decrease in selfish investment and thus a decrease in the actor’s fraction of the 
group resource. 
 
Benefit Function: Linear 
The remaining cooperative efforts, x, are combined and converted into group resources 
(G), the way in which those efforts combine varies according to the benefit function. In its 
simplest form, cooperative efforts can combine additively, producing a linear benefit function, 
with group output increasing linearly with increasing cooperation. In the case of linear rate of 
returns, a rare mutant playing the cooperative strategy x in a population playing x* would yield 
the following group output: 
𝐺𝐿  =  [(𝑥) +  𝑟 (𝑛 −  1)(𝑥) + (1 −  𝑟)(𝑛 −  1)(𝑥
∗)]                       (Eqn 3) 
 
Benefit Function: Nonlinear 
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Cooperative efforts can also combine in a non-linear fashion, so that increasing rates of 
cooperation lead to accelerating or diminishing returns in group output, or some combination of 
the two to form a sigmoid. These classes of non-linear rates of return are of special interest 
because they most closely approximate collective behaviors of interest in this model.  
 To characterize collective behaviors mathematically, a function is required to explicitly 
describe how individual behaviors accumulate and culminate in benefits at the group level. Here, 
I adapt the Hill equation (Hill 1910) used to describe the dynamics of cooperative binding from 
biochemistry as an analogy for how cooperative behaviors combine to produce emergent 
benefits. To carry this analogy mathematically, I make the following substitutions: 
 
Hill Equation              Group Output Function for a Collective Behavior 
% 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 =
1
1+(
𝐾
[𝐿]
)
𝐻   𝐺𝑁 =  
1
1+(
𝑛∗𝑖
∑ 𝑥
)
𝑠 
 
In the Hill equation, the percent of sites bound increases non-linearly with the 
concentration of the ligand, [L]. In the group output function for a collective behavior (GN), 
group output increases non-linearly with the total contribution of cooperative efforts, represented 
by the sum of x-values. The shape of these curves are controlled in two ways: (1) the steepness 
of the curve at its point of inflection can vary as determined by the exponent H or s (Fig. 4.1A), 
and (2) the point along the x-axis where inflection occurs, i (Fig. 4.1B).  
In the Hill equation, curve steepness is determined by the Hill coefficient ‘H’. Each 
biomolecule has its own unique value according to its physical properties (Hemoglobin’s Hill 
coefficient is between 2.3 and 3.0). In the group output function (GN), s determines the steepness 
in the rate of return. As with each type of biomolecule, the steepness of the group output curve, s, 
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is expected to vary based on the type of collective behavior and on the biology and ecology of 
species in question. The s-value for a given collective behavior can be quantified and measured 
by plotting a group’s level of cooperation against the payoff to the group (although this data is 
rarely collected). In the equation used here, s can be any value greater than or equal to one. 
The point of inflection in the Hill equation is captured by the disassociation constant, K, 
or the concentration of ligand at which the rate of binding and disassociation are equivalent. This 
can also be visualized as the point of inflection, i, on the curve. To mathematically represent this, 
I multiply the group size, n, by the inflection value, i, which is a value between 0 and 1. The 
expression ‘n*i’ accounts for groups of variable size, but the important term here is ‘i’: small 
values of ‘i' mean that an inflection comes early and values closer to 1 mean the inflection comes 
later. Early inflection result in concave down functions, late inflections result in concave up 
functions, and intermediate values result in sigmoid curves.  
Ultimately, the group output function (GN) converts cooperation into a benefit or resource 
for the group, but at rates that a determined by the values s and i (Fig. 4.1). In order to evaluate 
the effects of non-linear benefits on the evolution of cooperation, it is critical to isolate the 
effects of curve shape in the analysis. Due to the structure of the benefit function, altering the 
shape reduces the maximum possible group output, which will have a secondary influence on 
evolutionary stable outcomes. To overcome this limitation and standardize the group output, I 
multiplied the group output by 1 + 𝑖𝑠. This modification sets the maximum group output to the 
group size, regardless of output function’s shape.  
 
Fitness Functions 
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Now that both the selfish fraction and the group output functions have been defined, the 
fitness equation for both a linear and a non-linear context can be built by taking the product of 
the two components. The following is the fitness function for a rare mutant in the case of a linear 
benefit function:  
𝑊𝐿  =  
[(𝑥)+ 𝑟 (𝑛 − 1)(𝑥)+ (1 − 𝑟)(𝑛 − 1)(𝑥∗)]∗(1−𝑥)
(1−𝑥) + 𝑟 (𝑛 − 1)(1−𝑥) + (1 − 𝑟)(𝑛 − 1)(1−𝑥∗)
                (Eqn 4) 
The following is the fitness function for a rare mutant in the case of a non-linear benefit 
function: 
𝑊𝑁 =  
(1−𝑥)
(1−𝑥) + 𝑟 (𝑛 − 1)(1−𝑥) + (1 − 𝑟)(𝑛 − 1)(1−𝑥∗)
∗  
1
1+(
𝑛∗𝑖
𝑥+𝑟(𝑛−1)𝑥+(1−𝑟)(𝑛−1)𝑥∗ 
)
𝑠 ∗ 𝑛 ∗  (1 + 𝑖𝑠)   (Eqn 5) 
 
Solving for the ESS 
Using the above fitness equations, the evolutionary stable strategy, xESS, can be 
determined for each scenario. This is achieved by determining the rate of cooperation at which 
fitness is maximized while all group members adopt the same strategy ( x=x*).The expression 
for maximum fitness, W, is determined  by taking the partial derivative of W with respect to x, 
and setting the derivative equal to 0 to find the maxima and minima.  
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥= 𝑥∗
= 0 
The maximization expression above is then rearranged to solve for the value of x (cooperation) at 
which individual fitness is maximized. I then verified that the solution is a real maxima and not a 
minimum or end-point using the second-derivative test. The linear form of the fitness function 
yields an analytical solution, in which the evolutionary stable rate of cooperation is: 
𝑥𝐸𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 =
1 − 𝑟 + 𝑛𝑟
𝑛
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 The non-linear fitness function cannot be solved analytically, so I analyzed this part by 
plotting numerical solutions given a range of values for each parameter {n = 2-107 ; r = 0-1; i = 
0-1; s = 1-9}. I examined how the numerical stable rates of cooperation changed with respect to 
each parameter independently, and with respect to the linear solution.  
 
Results 
 Non-linear returns to cooperation can increase the stable rates of cooperation in a group, 
however, they do not do so universally. Only benefit functions with later and steeper inflections 
will boost cooperation beyond the case of linear benefit functions (Fig. 4.2). For other curve 
shapes, non-linear returns instead reduce rates of cooperation. In order to more thoroughly 
evaluate the effect of the benefit curve on the stable rates of cooperation, I summarize the effects 
of each parameter on the shape of the curve and compare their outcomes to the linear case. 
 
Curve Steepness 
 Increasing the benefit curve’s steepness ‘s’ generally increases the ESS cooperation rate 
(Fig. 4.2A). At most s-values, non-linear returns provide a boost to cooperation beyond the linear 
condition. Cooperation is higher when the curve is sigmoidal (at intermediate values of s) than 
when it is concave-down or step-like. When s is small, the benefit function adopts a concave-
down shape, which always yields higher payoffs than the linear curve for all rates of cooperation. 
Therefore low s values require less total cooperation to achieve equivalent benefits than when 
benefits accrue linearly.  
 As s-values get increasingly large, the curve approaches a step-function. The rate of 
cooperation stops increasing when the curve adopts this step-function and begins to decrease 
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mildly. This mild decrease in cooperation at high s-values is most pronounced in smaller groups, 
but becomes negligible as groups get larger. This mild decrease in cooperation is due to the fact 
that the incremental pay-off for additional cooperation becomes ever smaller after the steepest 
part of the curve is reached. After this point, incremental benefits for additional cooperation get 
smaller, and decrease in a non-linear fashion. To summarize, the higher the s-value, the more 
step-like the benefit function, the more rapidly diminishing are the benefits to additional 
cooperation once the ‘step’ in the curve has been cleared.  
 
Point of Inflection 
 As the point of inflection moves to the right along the x-axis, the stable rate of 
cooperation increases (Fig. 4.2B). This can be explained by the fact that as inflection points 
come later, more cooperation is necessary to achieve the benefits brought about by cooperating. 
Conversely, as inflection points come earlier, relatively less cooperation is required to achieve 
those benefits, and stable rates of cooperation are consequently lower.  
 Even though shifting the inflection point towards higher values predicts an increase in 
cooperation generally, nonlinear benefits only provide a boost to cooperation beyond the linear 
condition at later inflections. In this manner, linear returns to cooperation actually result in 
higher rates of cooperation than non-linear benefits that have early inflections.  
 
Curve Shape Interactions 
 The effects of curve steepness and the inflection point interact to influence the stable 
rates of cooperation. In general, the inflection point exerts a stronger influence over stable rates 
of cooperation than curve steepness. Early inflections always reduce cooperation below that of 
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linear returns, regardless of steepness. Increasing curve steepness at early inflections (i.e. 
concave down curves) will actually decrease cooperation, which is the opposite of s’s effect 
when inflections come later. Curve steepness only begins to exert greater control over 
cooperation rates after inflection points occur at higher values (i.e. sigmoid curves).  
 
Relatedness 
 Increasing relatedness among group members increases the stable rate of cooperation in 
both linear and nonlinear benefit curves, such that groups with higher relatedness have higher 
rates of cooperation (Fig. 4.4A). Non-linear benefit curves elevate cooperation beyond the linear 
case, but only at relatedness values in the lower range. This effect is reversed at higher levels of 
relatedness, with non-linear benefits yielding lower rates of cooperation than the linear case. This 
result is due to the fact that the potential advantages for further cooperation are greater for non-
linear returns than for linear returns at lower relatedness (and thus lower total cooperation). 
Conversely, at high relatedness, the potential advantages of further cooperation are greater for 
linear benefits.  
 More precisely, the advantage of being slightly more cooperative depends on the slope of 
the benefit curve at that group’s level of cooperation. The cooperation level at which linear and 
non-linear returns have equal slopes is the point at which the incentive for further cooperation is 
the same (for a given relatedness value and group size). This effect is depicted in the Figs. 4.4 (B 
& C) and Fig. 4.5, where the curve representing the rate of per capita benefit for non-linear 
returns meets that of the linear case. Cooperation decreases relative to the linear case when slope 
of the non-linear curve in Fig. 4.4C falls below the linear curve at higher relatedness values (or 
higher rates of cooperation). This leads to the non-intuitive prediction that nonlinear benefits can 
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elevate cooperation in groups with low relatedness, but that nonlinear benefits can actually 
reduce cooperation in groups with high relatedness or that are already highly cooperative.  
 
Group Size 
 For both the linear and non-linear forms of the model, increasing group size reduces 
stable cooperation rates. In the case of linear returns, the rate of cooperation approaches the 
value of relatedness as group size approaches infinity, however these effects are realized at group 
sizes starting at about 20. In the case of nonlinear returns, the boost to cooperation beyond linear 
benefits grows as group size increases (Fig. 4.3). At very small group sizes, linear returns always 
yield higher rates of cooperation than the nonlinear case, regardless of curve steepness. Thus as 
groups get smaller, the rates of cooperation for linear and non-linear models become more 
similar. In brief, the cooperation boost provided by non-linear benefits increases as groups get 
larger.  
 In addition, group size and relatedness interact in a complex way to influence stable rates 
of cooperation. As described above, at low relatedness values, non-linear returns lead to higher 
rates of cooperation than the linear case, but this boost to cooperation increases as group size 
increases. However, as relatedness increases, increasing group size promotes cooperation less. 
These interacting effects can be visualized in Figure 4.3, where the difference in cooperation 
between a linear and a non-linear benefit function for a group of 3 individuals is only about 10%, 
whereas that difference doubles to about 20% as groups reach a size of 20 individuals. In 
summary, the boost to cooperation provided by non-linear returns in large groups is diminished 
in groups with higher relatedness. 
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Discussion 
 The goal of this model was to evaluate how synergistic interactions that lead to non-linear 
benefits can influence cooperation in a group. I attempt to capture the features of synergism that 
are especially prominent in collective behaviors by adopting a model from biochemistry, the Hill 
equation for cooperative binding. By allowing cooperation and competition to evolve in response 
to the shape the benefit function, group size and relatedness, I uncover the following predictions. 
 
Sigmoid Shape 
 This model confirms the results of others that nonlinear returns to cooperation have the 
potential to enhance cooperation beyond additive returns (Boza & Számadó 2010, Archetti & 
Scheuring 2010), however I find this result is not universally true. The sigmoid benefit function 
has the effect of driving cooperation higher in some cases, but destabilizing cooperation in 
others. Other models of nonlinear public goods make different predictions based on the benefit 
function they use. When accelerating or diminishing returns are analyzed independently (Peña et 
al 2015, Van Cleve & Açkay 2014, Frank 2010, Hauert et al. 2006, Foster 2004), the power of 
nonlinearities to drive cooperation is underestimated. Sigmoid curves, which include both 
accelerating and decelerating components at once, predict higher rates of cooperation than curves 
of diminishing returns only. Alternatively, when a step-function is used in place of a smooth 
sigmoid function (Bach et al 2006, Archetti 2009), cooperation is predicted to only go as high as 
the point at which the public good is produced, but no farther. While this result is similar to the 
one outlined here, it fails to incorporate the important effects of curve steepness or relatedness 
outlined below, which will shift the stable point of cooperation away from the step-function’s 
point of threshold (Figs 4.4 & 4.5). 
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 The cooperation-promoting effect of the sigmoid derives from the accelerating portion of 
the curve. If relatively low cooperation is predicted by classic, linear public goods games 
(because of low relatedness or large group size), a sigmoid benefit function has the effect of 
boosting cooperation in such groups. The strength of this result is also determined by the location 
of the inflection point, with later the inflection points leading to greater boosts to cooperation. 
On the other hand, the diminishing returns portion of the sigmoid after the inflection point will 
conversely reduce cooperation. When the rate of return drops below that of the linear curve, the 
incremental benefits of additional cooperation fall below those achieved through linear returns 
(Fig. 4.4C, 4.5B). As such, the earlier the inflection point, the stronger the deterrent to 
cooperation. Thus, the combined effects of the sigmoid curve lead to the non-intuitive prediction 
that nonlinear benefits can elevate cooperation in groups with low cooperation, but reduce 
cooperation in groups that are already highly cooperative.  
  This prediction for reduced cooperation may explain the high frequency of worker 
reproduction in slave-making ants (Heinze 1996, Foitzik & Herbers 2001, Brunner et al. 2005). 
While sex-ratio theory has been invoked to explain elevated worker reproduction in slave-maker 
workers (Herbers & Stuart 1998, Bourke 1989, Trivers and Hare 1976), patterns of worker 
reproduction could also be attributed to diminishing returns to cooperation of the slave-maker 
lifestyle. Aside from conducting raids, obligate slave-maker workers are liberated from colony 
maintenance, so the benefits to staying active and sterile outside the raiding season are likely to 
have few advantages. In addition, the benefits of increasingly large raiding parties or additional 
raids beyond some threshold may produce diminishing yields, as is the case for T. americanus 
(unpublished data). Furthermore, slave raids usually make use of far fewer slave-maker works 
than are available. The number of workers required for a successful raid can therefore be viewed 
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as the point of inflection, with additional slave-maker worker participation yielding diminishing 
returns. One prediction of this hypothesis is that species which require a smaller fraction of their 
colony for raids will have higher frequencies of reproductive workers, although there are 
currently insufficient data on raiding behavior to test this. This explanation is not necessarily an 
alternative to the sex-ratio hypothesis, but could explain why these reproductive workers are not 
policed by the queen.  
 
Curve Steepness 
 The model also predicts that cooperation will increase as the benefit curve increases in 
steepness. This prediction has also been identified by Archetti & Scheuring (2010) for sigmoid 
functions, and by Foster (2004) and Frank (2010) for accelerating or decelerating functions, 
however the implications of these predictions have not been thoroughly unpacked, especially 
with reference to collective behaviors.  
 This prediction is satisfied by social spiders in the Anelosimus (Theridiidae) group, which 
are known to capture prey cooperatively on a large shared web. In social spiders, different prey 
sizes effectively give rise to different benefit functions. Cooperative capture of larger prey items 
leads to a steep rise in resources for the colony, approximating a sigmoid function (Kim et al. 
2005, Yip et al. 2008). On the other hand, cooperative capture of smaller prey items yields 
benefits at a linear rate, as increasing cooperative effort yields proportionally more prey items. 
Thus, the availability of larger prey items creates conditions for non-linear returns to 
cooperation, and under these conditions, colonies are predicted to exhibit higher rates of 
cooperation according to the model here. This prediction is satisfied by Powers & Aviles (2007) 
and Purcell & Aviles (2007), who show that low elevation colonies that have access to larger 
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prey are more cooperative than colonies at higher elevations that have access to smaller, but 
more numerous prey.  
 Evidence for this prediction is also found in a comparison of two sympatric social spider 
species which differed in their body and group size. As group size increased, the benefit function 
for the small species (A. domingo) is steeper than it was for the larger species (A. eximus; 
Guevara & Aviles 2011). The model predicts that cooperation will therefore be greater in A. 
domingo colonies, and indeed more individuals participate in prey capture in groups and there is 
greater participation across all age classes. A. domingo also forms smaller groups, which is also 
consistent with the model’s prediction that cooperation declines with group size; however there 
were no group size differences in the population sampled for this study. 
 
Group Size  
 The model predicts that cooperation declines as group size increases, a result that is 
consistent with other tug-of-war models with linear returns (Reeve & Hölldobler 2007) and other 
models of non-linear public goods (Boza & Számadó 2010).  This pattern is due to a greater 
reliance on other group members to produce benefits as groups get larger, resulting in a ‘free-
loader’ phenomenon. However, the sigmoid curve mitigates this free-loader problem at high 
group sizes, as free-loaders pay a greater cost to defecting if the steepest part of the benefit 
function hasn’t been cleared. As a consequence, the boosts to cooperation provided by sigmoid 
benefit functions are predicted to become stronger as group size increases.  
 This prediction has the strongest implications for collective behaviors that emerge 
through self-organizing. The expression of such collective behaviors are often group-size 
dependent and occur predominantly in larger groups (Dornhaus et al 2012). Thus, the role of 
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such collective behaviors in regulating cooperation may be limited to groups that are already 
large. Although models with linear benefits predict that cooperation declines as group size 
increases, this prediction suggests that collective behaviors of this variety may help maintain 
cooperation as groups increase in size. In addition, if nonlinear benefits provide the strongest 
boosts to cooperation in larger groups, then self-organized collective behaviors may play a larger 
role in driving the elaboration of sociality rather than its origin, consistent with the conclusions 
of Avila & Fromhage (2015). 
 
Group Output  
 All the predictions made here assume that the maximum possible group output is 
equivalent regardless of the shape of the benefit function. Ultimately, the benefit functions 
favored by selection will be the ones with the greatest per-capita pay off when everyone plays 
the stable rate of cooperation. Identifying which benefit functions will yield the highest payoffs 
is not encompassed by the model here, but this model does provide some guidance if such data 
were available. For instance, if behavioral innovations that create steeper inflections result in 
greater outputs, then the model predicts that cooperation will increase in those cases. Consider 
instead a case where behavioral innovations with the greatest outputs are produced by early 
inflections, then the model predicts that cooperation will decrease in those systems. More 
generally, selection favoring a more productive set of interactions, and the coinciding benefit 
function, will carry cooperation along with it. When the payoffs from cooperation exceed any 
losses, then the interaction more closely resembles a mutualism and there is no longer the social 
dilemma of a public goods game (Clutton-Brock 2002). 
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 It is unlikely that behavioral innovations that alter the shapes of the benefit functions will 
leave the pay-offs unaffected. There is no precedent, however, for assuming that certain shapes 
should lead to greater or lesser group outputs. It is plausible that interactions that lead to a steep 
increase in the benefit function (like a phase-transition) will coincide with an increase in the 
group’s resources. For instance, collective organization or coordination is expected to improve 
group efficiency or reliability through division of labor (Oster & Wilson 1978) or it may expand 
the range of resources available to a group, for instance through coordinated carrying (McCreery 
& Breed 2014) or attack (Berryman et al. 1985). The key point here is that collective behaviors 
that are fitness enhancing will not necessarily increase cooperation, however they will if they are 
both fitness enhancing and arise in a non-linear fashion.  
 
Future Directions 
 The findings from this model highlight the importance of curve steepness in 
understanding the evolution of cooperation and collective behaviors, however more focused data 
collection on the rate of returns are needed. Researchers working on cooperative species can 
collect this data by measuring the pay-offs resulting from variable levels of a group’s cooperative 
investment. This could include measuring the effort of individuals towards a collective task (e.g. 
time spent hunting) or the degree to which individuals invest in their personal fertility (e.g. 
ovarian development). Collecting a continuous measure of this relationship will reveal the rate at 
which benefits accrue, yielding ‘s’ values that are specific to a given population or species, or 
which pertain to certain behaviors or ecologies. Empirical measures of a behavior’s inflection 
point ‘i’ would also result from the same data collection method. Natural variation in cooperation 
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is often overlooked in place of averages or such variability is removed through controlled 
experimental groups, even though such continuous variation may be instructive.  
 The predictions from this model can also be applied more specifically to the study of 
collective behavior. First, more data is needed on which benefit shapes most commonly 
characterize coordinated behaviors that lead to emergent properties or collective actions. At what 
level of participation are the benefits from a collective behavior realized and at what point are 
returns diminishing? Second, one could gather data on how subtle changes in interactions or 
individual behaviors alter the steepness of a benefit curve. For instance, does the use of a 
communication signal to coordinate the timing of an action raise the group output or generate a 
steeper benefit function? One could also gather data on how external factors, like ecological 
conditions could also alter the shape of the benefit function. Such variation could be captured, 
for instance, by looking at geographic gradients (as was demonstrated above with the social 
spiders) or through changes in the seasons. Classifying collective behaviors according to their 
benefit functions will facilitate comparisons between species that lead to a more general 
understanding of the role of collective behavior in social evolution.  
 Furthermore, more work is needed to understand how collective behaviors arise in 
relation to group size. The relationship between group size and self-organized behaviors is 
reviewed in Dornhaus et al. (2012), but there are still relatively few empirical studies that 
determine how group size relates to the expression of collective behaviors. To what extent are 
nonlinear benefits limited to large groups, and to what extent are small groups limited to additive 
benefits? Patterns relating group size to different benefit curves would help disentangle their 
independent effects on cooperation.  
113 
 
 While many examples of collective behaviors are in species that have extremely high 
levels of cooperation and thus invariable in their levels of cooperation, such species will not be 
informative for testing the predictions of this model. However, understanding the selective forces 
and evolutionary processes that promote cooperation will help explain the trajectories that led to 
these more extreme social forms. As such, the predictions from this model will only be testable 
in species that retain some variation in their levels of cooperation. Possible study groups include 
simple eusocial groups, (e.g. Ponerine ants, Halictid bees, bumble bees, and Polistes wasps), and 
cooperative or communal breeders. Case studies need not be limited by reproductive 
cooperation, but could include cases where groups require cooperative effort to complete some 
task, such as when bark beetles overwhelm plant defenses as a group (Raffa & Berryman 1983). 
Any instances where cooperative groups engage in group-level or highly coordinated behaviors, 
such as the ‘war dances’ in meerkats (Jordan et al. 2007), the formation of fruiting bodies in 
social amoeba (Strassmann et al. 2000), or cooperative nest construction in sociable weavers 
(Leighton 2014) offer contexts to test the model’s main predictions.  
 Future attempts to model the co-evolution of cooperation and collective behavior should 
focus instead on evolving collective behaviors that give rise to s- and i-values. Agent-based 
simulations of collective behavior would allow individual decision or interaction rules to evolve 
given some group’s level of cooperation, such that benefit functions arise as a byproduct of 
optimal rules.  Another extension of this model would be to permit players to differ in their 
competitive or reproductive efficiencies. The symmetrical structure of the model here most 
directly applies to groups where all individuals share an equal ability to take and use the 
communal group resource, either breeding independently or communally. However, many 
cooperative groups are not symmetrical, and instead include a dominant breeder who is more 
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efficient at monopolizing or converting group resources into fitness than subordinate helpers, as 
exemplified in cooperatively breeding vertebrates (Koenig & Dickinson 2004) or social insect 
colonies (Wilson 1971). In order to model the evolution of collective behaviors in these 
asymmetrical groups, the current model would require a two roles with an efficiency coefficient 
to differentiate dominants from subordinates, and may predict different outcomes (Rubenstein et 
al. 2016).  
 
Implications and Conclusions 
 Understanding the role of nonlinear benefits in the evolution of cooperation will more 
fully provide an explanation for why cooperation is maintained in biological systems. In 
addition, nonlinearities may be instrumental in explaining the co-existence of cooperation and 
conflict. The influence of nonlinear returns to promote cooperation are enhanced when such 
returns are steeper and in larger groups. However, nonlinear returns can discourage cooperation 
when thresholds (i.e. inflections) come early or groups are highly related. 
 The importance of nonlinear returns to cooperation may be especially relevant to the 
evolution of collective behaviors, which are likely to produce benefits in a nonlinear fashion. The 
role of synergistic or nonlinear interactions have been suggested to evolve in a positive feed-back 
loop with cooperation (Corning & Szathmary 2015), such that nonlinear interactions promote 
cooperation and cooperation promotes selection for more efficient interactions. The model here 
provides the first formal treatment of collective behaviors in the context of cooperation, 
providing theoretical support for the first step in this feedback loop. More empirical work is 
needed to confirm the effects of nonlinear benefits on cooperation, and their relevance to specific 
collective behaviors.   
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Figure 4.1: Group output curves for differently shaped benefit functions. Group size is fixed at 
ten (n=10) and the maximum group output is standardized to group size. The red dotted-line 
depicts the group output for linear returns to cooperation in both. (A) Three superimposed 
nonlinear benefit curves, which differ in their steepness (inflection, i = 0.5.) (B) Three nonlinear 
benefit curves, which differ in their point of inflection (curve steepness, s = 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. (A) The evolutionarily stable rate of cooperation rises as the steepness of the benefit 
curve (s) increases [relatedness (r) = 0.5, inflection (i) = 0.5, group size (n) = 107 ]. (B) The 
evolutionarily stable rate of cooperation rises as the point of inflection increases [relatedness (r) 
= 0.5, curve steepness (s) = 4, group size (n) = 107 ]. For comparison, the stable rate of 
cooperation for linear returns is plotted as the dotted line for equivalent group size and 
relatedness parameter values. 
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Figure 4.3: The stable rate of cooperation decreases as group size increases for both linear 
(dotted-lines) and nonlinear benefit functions (smooth lines).  Three pairs of plots are depicted 
for different values of relatedness {r=0.2, 0.5, 0.8}, and are derived from an equivalent 
sigmoidal nonlinear benefit function [inflection (i) = 0.5, curve steepness (s) = 4]. For r=0.2 
(green) and r=0.5 (blue), cooperation stays higher for nonlinear benefit functions, and the 
difference between linear and nonlinear ESS cooperation rates increases with group size. For 
higher relatedness, r=0.8 (grey), cooperation stays higher for linear benefit functions and the 
difference between the two stay relatively unchanged as group size increases.  
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Figure 4.4: (A) The stable rate of cooperation increases with relatedness for both linear and 
nonlinear benefit functions. As relatedness increases, stable rates of cooperation start above the 
linear solutions and transition to below. (B) Benefit functions used to derive the lines in part (A). 
Each dot superimposed onto the benefit function represents the stable rate of cooperation for 
each benefit function at different relatedness values. (C) The instantaneous slope of the benefit 
function at the ESS cooperation rate for different relatedness values (r ={0.1, 0.3, 0.5,0.7, 0.9}). 
This figure depicts the relatedness values at which the nonlinear rate of return (i.e. slope) falls 
below the linear slope, illustrating why nonlinear benefits predict a decrease in cooperation at 
high relatedness. All benefit functions assume large group size (n) = 107 and the nonlinear 
benefit function has a curve steepness (s) = 5, inflection (i) = 0.5. 
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Figure 4.5: (A) The two nonlinear benefit functions here differ in their point of inflection (grey, 
i = 0.2; black, i = 0.8), and in the center is the linear benefit function (red dashed-line). Each dot 
superimposed onto the benefit function represents the stable rate of cooperation for different 
relatedness values (0.1-0.9). The position of the dots, or ESS cooperation rates, illustrates how 
curve shape shifts cooperation up or down, especially in relation to the linear case. (B) The 
distribution of ESS cooperation rates depends partly on the instantaneous slope of the benefit 
function. For the nonlinear curve with infl = 0.2, the slope lies above the linear case, but falls 
below at approx. r= 0.6. This reduction in slope below the linear case leads to a decrease in 
cooperation at high relatedness. Conversely, the slope of nonlinear curve with infl = 0.8 stays 
above the linear slope after passing the steepest part of the curve, and ESS cooperation is 
consistently higher than the linear case. All benefit functions assume large group size (n) = 107 
and a curve steepness (s) = 5. 
 
Table 4.1: List of model parameters and their definitions. 
Variable Definition 
n Number of individuals in the group 
r Relatedness between group members 
G Group Output, or shared resource produced by the group. GL refers to additive or 
linear accumulation of resources. GN refers to a nonlinear accumulation of resources. 
F The fraction of the group resource acquired by the focal group member. This is the 
result of selfish effort relative to the selfish efforts of the rest of the group 
x cooperative effort (0<x<1) 
1-x Selfish effort 
x* Population cooperative effort 
s Curve steepness - this is analogous to the Hill Coefficient. Each biomolecule or 
collective behavior will have a unique value. 
i Point of inflection – the proportion of group cooperative effort at which the curve 
steepness is greatest. 
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